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Comprehensive Land Use Planning:
Learning How and Where to Grow
John R. Nolon*
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from
here?" asked Alice. "That depends a good deal on where you
want to get to," said the cat.1
I. Introduction
A. An Aging Citadel Under Siege
Land use in this country is determined by zoning ordi-
nances adopted by local governments. Their provisions dictate
the types of uses to which land may be put, the density at which
development may happen, the height, size and shape of build-
ings, and the mix of commercial, residential, public and other
land uses in each locality. Zoning is a key method by which soci-
ety encourages the development of jobs and housing, protects
natural resources and the environment, and defines the charac-
ter of its communities.
The law of most states stipulates that zoning is valid only if
it is in accordance with a comprehensive land use plan.2 Plan-
ning "is the essence of zoning" says the judiciary in New York
State. Comprehensive planning is society's insurance that the
public welfare is served by land use regulation."
As the predicate for zoning, comprehensive planning is a
critical public function. What constitutes comprehensive plan-
* B.A. University of Nebraska 1963; J.D. University of Michigan 1966. Mr. Nolon is
Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law where he directs the Land Use Law
Center and teaches and writes in the areas of land use, property, environmental regula-
tion, and real estate transactions and finance.
1. LEWIS CARROL. ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 64 (Penguin Books 1960)
(1865).
2. 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND.PLANNING,
§ 12.02 (1992); see infra note 112.
3. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d
888, 893 (1968).
4. See, e.g., id., 235 N.E.2d at 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94.
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ning and how planning is done are determined by state legisla-
tures.5 Given the importance of land use and the central legal
role of comprehensive planning, one would expect state statutes
to carefully define a comprehensive land use plan and to provide
a predictable, reliable and effective method of land use planning.
Surprisingly, this is not the case in the majority of states, in-
cluding New York.'
New York's statutes are typical of those of nearly half of the
states in this country.7 They do not define properly what a land
use plan is. There is no requirement that the plans be kept up-
to-date. They do not require that municipalities adopt such
plans before they enact zoning ordinances. Where a land use
plan and a zoning ordinance are adopted by a community, the
statutes do not specify how they are to be interrelated.
The benefit of this legal dissonance is flexibility. Since plans
can be whatever localities want them to be, zoning is equally
malleable, since its purpose is to accomplish the objectives of the
comprehensive plan. In this, danger lurks. Recent New York
cases, analyzed in this article, make it clear that land use regula-
tions will not be sustained if they are ad hoc, arbitrary, capri-
cious, unjust, unfair or irrational - characteristics they risk as-
suming if not demonstrably in conformance with a discrete and
well considered plan.
The biggest danger in this enigmatic system is its lack of a
regional perspective. Although the courts urge that local zoning
ordinances consider regional needs, 8 there is no such require-
ment in the statutes. Regional development patterns are shaped
by the uncoordinated land use decisions of local governments.
Our legal system vests these insular9 institutions with primary
authority to determine when and where development will occur.
The landscape affected by these uncoordinated decisions is
closely interrelated by the movement of air and water and of the
traffic of people as they commute to and from home, work, shop-
ping and recreation. Yet in most states, including New York,
5. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 2, §§ 1.02[1]-[2], at 1-25 to 1-29.
6. 1 id. § 12.04.
7. 1 id. § 12.04 n.3.
8. See infra notes 57-62, 330 and text accompanying.
9. See infria note 61 and text accompanying.
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there is no mechanism for interrelating the land use plans and
zoning ordinances of adjacent municipalities. 0 Increasingly,
state and federal statutes attempt to protect threatened estua-
ries, aquifers, air quality, wetlands, and transportation systems
by dealing with the effects of the land use patterns without har-
monizing the direction or substance of local land use plans
themselves.
In New York, the legal underpinnings of the current land
use system were set nearly eighty years ago.1" They were
designed in a different era to meet different challenges. In those
days, "comprehensive planning" referred to "city-wide" plan-
ning because developing communities were separated by open
spaces and land development impacts were local in character. At
that time, conformance with a comprehensive plan was defined
very loosely. Localities were not required to adopt discrete land
use plans. It was enough that zoning ordinances contained some
evidence of comprehensive planning. 2
In today's more complex and interrelated regions, "compre-
hensive" planning, in effect, means "regional" planning. Deci-
sions made in one municipality affect regional air quality, the
water quality of others in a watershed, and the cost and availa-
bility of housing and commercial real estate in the market area.
Without laws that require the adoption of discrete land use
plans, that tie zoning ordinances directly to the accomplishment
of the provisions of those plans, and that require some relation-
ship among local plans in the larger region, we are doomed, like
Alice, to have no way of knowing where we are going and, worse,
no method of getting there should we somehow decide how and
where we want to use and conserve the land. How we got so lost
on our road to comprehensive land use planning and how to find
the road to a mutually satisfactory destination are the keenest
questions facing land use regulators today.
B. Purpose of Article
This article explores the origins, evolution and contempo-
rary workings of the legal system that determines the use of
10. See infra note 68 and text accompanying.
11. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 2, § 12.07, at 12-45 to 12-50.
12. See infra notes 32-33 and text accompanying.
1993]
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land. In Part II, the development of zoning and comprehensive
planning laws in the United States is traced, emphasizing the
importance that zoning be "in conformance with" a comprehen-
sive land use plan, a requirement meant to provide direction and
purpose to land use regulation. This retrospect shows that, from
the beginning, the framers of the nation's land use regime were
indecisive. They failed to define a comprehensive plan, to detail
what such a plan should contain, and to prescribe how planning
should serve as the predicate for zoning. Decisions of New
York's highest court that criticize the state legislature's failure
to redress the enigmatic nature of the eighty year-old system are
discussed, so that contemporary challenges may be addressed.
Part III analyzes several New York cases that invalidate
zoning regulations because of their failure to conform to a com-
prehensive plan. A checklist of the charges that property owners
can bring successfully against land use regulations emerges from
this discussion and highlights the special vulnerability of regula-
tions that do not meet the historic "in conformance with"
requirement.
Part IV explores the notion that regulations can constitute
"takings" in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantees and
then describes how conformance with comprehensive planning
insulates regulations from Fifth Amendment challenges, as well
as from the historic checklist of charges discussed in Part III.
The failure of the statutory law to make comprehensive plan-
ning mandatory, and to tie regulations closely to it, is rectified,
to a degree, by the weight of the case law explored in this part.
The decisional law creates a practical necessity that local gov-
ernments adopt comprehensive land use plans, a partial accom-
modation of the statutory law's failure to do so. The argument is
advanced that this judicial imperative to plan before restricting
land use applies to all land use regulations, not just zoning.
Part V discusses two emerging land use issues. The first in-
volves the judicial requirement that local zoning, labeled "insu-
lar" by New York's highest court," must consider regional
needs. The second is how the rapidly increasing number of fed-
eral and state laws that affect land use are to be coordinated
with local land use regulations and conformed to the compre-
13. See infra note 61 and text accompanying.
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hensive plans that local regulations are to advance. How, for ex-
ample, in the absence of any formal division of the state into
planning regions, and without benefit of plans for those regions,
can local plans consider regional needs? Without cogent regional
plans, how can the plethora of local, state, and federal land use
regulations be harmonized? By concluding with an analysis of
the many constituent groups whose interests are compromised
by the lack of a regional solution to the land use dilemma, the
article ends with the unimaginative suggestion that New York
can and should address these issues and, in that process, decide
"where it wants to get to" regarding the use and preservation of
its land.
II. Background - The Enigma of Planning as the Legal
Basis for Zoning
A. History of Local Control of Land Development
A vigorous debate14 over the wisdom of conforming market
forces to a public plan for orderly development took place dur-
ing the early part of this century.15 It culminated decisively in
1926 in favor of comprehensive" control of development in the
United States Supreme Court decision, Village of Euclid v. Am-
14. Zoning was "seen either as a protection of the suburban American home against
the encroachment of urban blight and danger, or as the unrestrained caprice of village
councils claiming unlimited control over private property in derogation of the Constitu-
tion." Arthur V. N. Brooks, The Office File Box - Emanations from the Battlefield, in
ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 3, 7 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).
15. The acceptance of comprehensive zoning spread quickly as landowners began to
realize that reasonable restrictions, public control of the landowner's and neighboring
property for the public good, would tend to stabilize and preserve the value of all prop-
erty. 1 HAROLD M. LEwIs, PLANNING THE MODERN CITY 255 (1949). New York City's
adoption of comprehensive zoning in 1916 did in fact result in stabilized property values.
Id. at 261 (noting a statement made by Edward M. Bassett, a leader in New York's
adoption of comprehensive zoning). For example, prior to the adoption of comprehensive
zoning in New York City, the introduction of garment manufacturers into what had been
a shopping district along the lower portion of Fifth Avenue caused property values in the
district to drop by more than 50%, with a corresponding loss in tax revenues. 1 JAMES
METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 66-67 (2d ed. 1955).
16. Before the era of comprehensive zoning, a few cities utilized area, use, and
height restrictions separately. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at 258. It was not until New York
City determined that those protective restrictions and others should be collected in one
general ordinance, in order to protect land values and maintain the public health and
safety for the public good, that America's first comprehensive zoning regulation was
adopted. 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 7.
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
bier Realty Co. 1 7 Justice Sutherland's opiniorl reflected a gather-
ing consensus among state supreme court judges that public
guidance of private development was within the police power of
the states.
Euclid quoted two of these state court decisions to support
a pair of previously controversial notions. First, the "growing
complexity of our civilization make[s] it necessary for the State
* " to limit individual activities to a greater extent.""8 Second,
'[the court has] nothing to do with the question of the wisdom
* * of municipal ordinances. If they are not satisfying to a ma-
jority of the citizens, their recourse is to the ballot - not the
courts."1 9
The evolution of public control of land development started
centuries before the beginning of the Christian era.20 As an ex-
ample, a Roman commission in 451-450 B.C. adopted building
regulations that resemble the set-back requirements found in to-
day's zoning ordinances. 21 In 1581, certain noxious property uses
were banned "within the compass and precinct of two and
twenty miles from the City of London."22 Similar laws were
passed by the early American colonies. For example, in 1692,
certain business uses, deemed "offensive" by the Province of
Massachusetts Bay, were limited to certain locations. Violations
were punishable by fines, a portion of which was given to the
informer.2 3 Prior to the enactment of comprehensive zoning or-
dinances, some municipalities separately enacted use, area, and
height restrictions on building development.24
B. Codification of the Local Land Use Control System
During the first twenty-five years of the twentieth century,
local officials came to realize that narrowly focused, nuisance
17. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
18. Id. at 392 (quoting City of Aurora v. Burns, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (Ill. 1925)).
19. Id. at 393 (quoting State v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 444 (La. 1923)).
20. For examples of this evolution, including those referenced here, see ROBERT R.
WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 1-14 (3d ed. 1982)
and chapter 4 of 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15.
21. WRIGHT & GITELMAN, supra note 20, at 2.
22. Id. at 5-6.
23. Id. at 9.
24. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at 258.
[Vol. 13:351
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preventing legislation was not sufficient to address the needs of
the nation's increasingly complex urban areas.25 The first com-
prehensive zoning ordinance in the United States was passed in
1916 by New York City.2s Other cities soon followed the New
York example. 27
In 1922, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a
model statute, the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,28 to
promote zoning.29 The model act, with certain variations, was
adopted by most states as a method of encouraging and guiding
their municipalities in adopting zoning ordinances.3 0 So great
was the perceived need for the regulation of land development,
that by the time the Euclid case was decided in 1926, forty-three
states had passed enabling statutes and five hundred municipali-
ties had adopted local zoning ordinances.3" In this way, public
control of market forces in land development was codified.
Zoning, according to one view, was intended to be an end in
itself.32 However, the drafters of the enabling acts thought that
25. 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 14-15; see also Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87.
26. New York's comprehensive zoning efforts began in 1910 and culminated on July
25, 1916, through the adoption of the New York City Zoning Resolution. 1 LEWIs, supra
note 15, at 259; 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 7.
27. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at 262.
28. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1926) re-
printed in 5 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF's THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
app. A. (1988).
29. Herbert Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, appointed Frederick L. Olmsted,
Edward M. Bassett and Alfred Bettman to his nine-man advisory committee to the De-
partment of Commerce. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 328 (Richard P. Fishman ed.,
1978). This advisory committee on City Planning and Zoning promulgated the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) in 1922 and the Standard City Planning Enabling
Act (SPEA) in 1928. Id. Olmsted was a prominent landscape architect with an expansive
vision of the comprehensive plan and its importance. Id. at 327. Bassett served as chair
of the New York City Committee on Building Districts and Restrictions, whose work led
to the adoption of the first comprehensive zoning ordinance. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at
259-60. Bettman was a prominent Ohio attorney who wrote an amicus curiae brief on
behalf of the city in Euclid that is cited as the "primary source" of the Court's decision
in Euclid. William M. Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The
Players in Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 14, at 31,
32.
30. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 331.
31. It is no wonder "[tihe zoning idea ... spread with extraordinary rapidity, and it
may safely be stated that there is no aspect of city planning which [has] now attract[ed]
more attention." 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at 261.
32. The "unitary" view of zoning holds that the zoning ordinance itself contains
comprehensive planning principles and can exist independently from a comprehensive
19931
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more was needed. 3  A second model act, the Standard City Plan-
ning Enabling Act, 4 promulgated in 1928, promoted the adop-
tion of a local comprehensive land use plan as a document sepa-
rate and distinct from zoning3 5 This act, and its adoption by the
states, gave rise in some quarters to the notion that comprehen-
sive land use planning should precede the zoning ordinance and
plan without violating the legal requirement that zoning be "in accordance with" a com-
prehensive plan. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 332 & n.26; see also id.
at 342-44. The historical reason that zoning came before planning in the United States is
said to be the urgent need for its adoption to protect single-family districts, the local
tax-base and property values. See Jerry Mitchell, In Accordance with a Comprehensive
Plan: The Rise of Strict Scrutiny in Florida, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 79, 81 (1990)
(citing Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955) and Charles L. Simeon, The Paradox of "In Accordance with a Comprehen-
sive Plan" and Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Need for Efficient and Effective Judicial
Review of Land Use Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REV. 603 (1987)).
In part, the urgency for promoting zoning before planning resulted from Herbert
Hoover's effort to relieve housing shortages through "the adoption of zoning plans which
would protect residential districts .... [W]ith such protection assured, real estate owners
would be more likely to resume the building of houses." 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at 262.
These opinions are reinforced by this language from the report of New York City's advi-
sory committee on zoning, issued on December 23, 1913, prior to the adoption of the
nation's first comprehensive zoning ordinance:
It may seem paradoxical to hold that a policy of building restriction tends to a
fuller utilization of land than a policy of no restriction; but such is undoubtedly
the case. The reason lies in the greater safety and security to investment secured
by definite restrictions. The restrictions tend to fix the character of the
neighborhood.
Id. at 260 (quoting HEIGHTS OF BUILDING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE
HEIGHT, SIZE AND ARRANGEMENT OF BUILDINGS OF THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE AND APPOR-
TIONMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1913)). There is evidence that early proponents of
zoning were motivated as well by public health and safety matters, traffic congestion,
and the like. 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 7-8; 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M.
TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW 311 (1988). In fact, the United States Supreme Court
sustained zoning based on its similarity to common law prohibitions on the nuisance use
of private property. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
33. Bettman took the position that the comprehensiveness of the zoning ordinance
itself was the key consideration, although he recognized the importance of conforming to
a plan: "[Tihe fact that the zone plan is an organic part of the whole city plan furnishes
an additional item of proof of its reasonableness." Alfred Bettman, The Present State of
Court Decisions on Zoning, 2 CITY PLAN. 24, 26-27 (1926). "By zoning is meant the com-
prehensive zone plan based on a comprehensive survey; and if the zone plan be part of a
more comprehensive city plan, it derives from that fact an additional element of reasona-
bleness and therefore has additional constitutional support." Id. at 34.
34. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928).
35. THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 40 (David S. Arnold et al. eds.,
1979).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/5
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serve as its predicate. 6 In the promulgation of the model acts
and the progress of local land use regulation, zoning came first.
Many states adopted the Standard City Planning Enabling Act,
but after they had created the legal framework for zoning.
Most failed in any meaningful way to prescribe how zoning and
planning were to be integrated. This fissure remains today, nar-
rowed by provisions in most states that require zoning to be in
accordance with the comprehensive land use plan and by re-
forms in others that require a plan to be adopted before land use
is regulated.3 8 Because zoning preceded planning in both the
Hoover Commission and in most state legislatures, the enigma of
36. Lewis wrote that: "The danger is that [zoning] may be considered a substitute
for city planning and that, a zoning plan having been adopted, enthusiasm and interest
may die out. Zoning is not a substitute for a city plan; it is an essential part of a compre-
hensive plan." 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at 261-62.
Professor Charles Haar viewed the statutory comprehensive plan ... as a separate
document for purposes of zoning 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' In
light of the lack of specific authority in the [Standard State Zoning Enabling Act],
Haar recognized that his position was in the minority. But today there is a demon-
strable shift toward his point of view.... It is ironic that while Haar's writing was
widely quoted, and relied upon in a number of land-use decisions, he was fre-
quently cited to support the "unitary" view of the statutory requirement ... (the
zoning ordinance itself suffices as the comprehensive plan), a position he attacked
in his own writing.
HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 331-32 (footnotes omitted) (citing
Charles M. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154,
1157 (1955).
37. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 49 & n.238.
38. See infra note 85 for those states that have mandated local governments to
adopt comprehensive plans before regulating land use. The notes accompanying the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act state that the requirement that zoning be "in accor-
dance" with a comprehensive plan "will prevent haphazard and piecemeal zoning. No
zoning should be done without such a comprehensive study." HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER
LAW, supra note 29, at 328. Language in the Standard City Planning Enabling Act that
defines the content and role of the comprehensive plan throws further light on the legal
effect of the plan. The Standard City Planning Enabling Act defined the purpose of the
master plan as:
Guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development
of the municipality and its environs which will, in accordance with present and
future needs, best promote health, safety, order, morals, convenience, prosperity,
and general welfare as well as efficiency and economy in the process of develop-
ment, including, among other things, adequate provision for traffic, the provision
of safety from fire and other dangers, adequate provisions for light and air, the
promotion of good civic design, wise and efficient expenditure of public funds, and
the adequate provision of public utilities and other public requirements.
Id. at 329 (quoting SPEA § 7).
19931
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conforming zoning to planning is as old as comprehensive land
use regulation itself.
The Standard City Planning Enabling Act recommended
that plans be adopted by planning boards while zoning ordi-
nances were to be adopted by the local legislative bodies.3 9 This
separation of responsibility for the preparation of zoning ordi-
nances and land use plans renders the local land use system
more enigmatic; in practice, how can a local legislative body be
bound by a plan adopted by a lay board that is advisory in func-
tion? This division of authority has a certain logic, however. A
visionary, long-term plan for the community does not have
short-term impacts on property values and neighborhood char-
acter, and is less likely to arouse impassioned resistance. "' Since
a planning board is comprised of appointed, rather than elected,
members, the pressure of the electorate is felt less in its
deliberations."1
In these ways, long-term community planning is immunized
from short-term political considerations. To the extent that the
zoning ordinance, although adopted by the local legislature, an
elected body, is required to conform to the comprehensive land
use plan, it enjoys a degree of immunization from such pressures
39. Bassett recognized the difficulty of keeping the comprehensive plan current and
supported the notion that the planning board shall adopt the plan, not the municipal
legislature. EDWARD M. BASSETr, THE MASTER PLAN 83-84 (1938). Compare N.Y. GEN.
CITY LAW § 28-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993), and N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (McKin-
ney 1987 & Supp. 1993), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-722 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993)
(empowering planning boards to enact master plans) with N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(24)
(McKinney 1989), and N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1987), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-700 (McKinney 1973) (empowering town boards, village boards, and city councils,
respectively, to enact zoning ordinances).
40. "It is of the essence of zoning, therefore, that it regulates development. Planning
does not involve this coercive control, although zoning ordinances are the means whereby
planning goals are achieved." BEVERLY J. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED
STATES 4-5 (1982); see, e.g., Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198
(1936) (master plan does not effect a taking of property).
41. The important thing is that the work of planning be entrusted to [those
with] vision as well as technical training and experience .... [A] reasonable plan,
once decided upon, should be adhered to in its essential features notwithstanding
the opposition and the insistent demands for a departure from it which are likely
to be encountered from those who are actuated by selfish interest or who are una-
ble to look beyond their own limited horizon.
I LEWIS, supra note 15, at 17.
[Vol. 13:351
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as well.42
C. Defining a Land Use Plan
As this land use system evolved, basic concepts were left un-
defined, not the least of which was the definition of a compre-
hensive land use plan itself.43 The definitions of a comprehen-
sive land use plan used during the formative period of this
century are as numerous as are the terms used to describe such a
plan."' The document itself is called, variously, a master plan, a
42. There is a great need for the master plan even though it is visionary in nature,
for
[w]ithout one, if an emergency arises which brings a popular clamor for some par-
ticular bridge or tunnel or main thoroughfare, this clamor is likely to be translated
into a favorable vote by the [legislative body]. Later the [legislative body] may
discover that the new improvement which may have cost millions of dollars was
not co-ordinated with other features of the plan. Every city engineer of experience
realizes that there ought to be a master plan and also official maps.
BASSETT, supra note 39, at 69. Planning commissions are to give guidance to legislative
bodies; the "master plan" serves as the guide and should be "a plastic plan kept within
the confines of the commission." Id. at 67-68; see Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235
N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
43. A leading contemporary textbook on planning published by the American Plan-
ning Association defines a land use plan as having the following characteristics:
* It is primarily a physical plan, although it may incorporate social and economic
objectives.
* It is long-range, slightly utopian, inspired by a vision of the future, and provides
how to get there.
* It is comprehensive, dealing with the entire community and its major develop-
ment issues: transportation, housing, land use, utilities, recreation and their
interrelationships.
* The plan contains a statement of policy and is a guide to the land use actions of
local legislators and other decision-makers.
THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 35.
44. 1 LEwis, supra note 15, at 7-8, quotes several early experts on the definition of a
land use plan. George McAneny, who was Chairman of the Board of the Regional Plan-
ning Association, defined city planning as:
getting ready for the future ... growth. It is the guidance into proper channels of
a community's impulses towards a larger and broader life. On the face it has to do
with things physical - the laying out of streets and parks and rapid-transit lines.
But its real significance is far deeper; a proper city plan has a powerful influence
for good upon the mental and moral development of the people. It is the firm base
for the building of a healthy and happy community.
Id. at 7. Earle S. Draper defined city planning as:
a great number of things. Careful surveys and inventories of resources are necessa-
rily the first requirement. The deliberative process which we call planning consists
of an analysis of the facts, of an appraisal of the situation, and of the resulting
considered opinion which comes forth as a plan presented in the proper garb,
11
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comprehensive plan, a comprehensive master plan, a land use
plan, a comprehensive land use plan, an official master plan, and
so on."5 There was no clear agreement as to whether this docu-
ment should limit itself to physical phenomena,'6 or should in-
clude economic, demographic, and social matters.7 What is
meant by comprehensive itself is unclear."" Most definitions pre-
suppose a local focus, but some include regional and state-wide
considerations. 9 The precise relationship of the comprehensive
whether it be pictures, charts, maps, verbal descriptions, or a combination of all of
these.
Id. Nelson P. Lewis defined it as "simply the exercise of such foresight as will promote
the orderly and sightly development of a city and its environs along rational lines with
due regard for health, amenity, and convenience and for its commercial and industrial
advancement." Id.
45. 'Planning,' as it was conceived by its great early advocates, Bassett, Bettman,
and others, involved a great deal more than the preparation of one all-controlling,
definitive plan which was to be the blueprint for all public and private develop-
ment. On the contrary, there were to be many plans, each evolved for a special
purpose, some outlining proposed public development, others outlining sub-divi-
sion control, and still others showing where it was proposed to curb private build-
ing - the zoning map. Some plans thus drawn were to have the force of local law
(such was the zoning map); others were merely to forecast future developments
(e.g., population changes), and others were to be essentially advisory in their na-
ture. The master plan, properly so called, was to be of the latter variety, incorpo-
rating the planner's ideas as to the ideal development of the community.
POOLEY, supra note 40, at 14-15.
46. [A] different type [of definition] appears in the following statement by Ed-
ward M. Bassett, an attorney eminent in planning and zoning law:
City planning subjects are streets, parks, public reservations, sites for public
buildings, harbor lines, locations for transportation facilities, and zoning regu-
lations. There may be others, but I think not. When these are stamped by law
on the land, there you have a city plan.
1 LEwIs, supra note 15, at 7-8.
47. The evolution of planning science is influenced in part by the following: (1)
demographics; (2) economics; (3) views of government responsibility; (4) planning theo-
ries; and (5) the ever emerging stressors in our developed and developing regions. Hous-
ING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 325.
48. The American public is not educated to the necessity of a comprehensive
plan, but is sometimes alive to ... one feature of such a plan, as, for instance,
transportation or zoning; and the planner, unable to do what he would, must do
what he can. In such cases, however, the need of a general plan should always be
kept in mind, and as an incident to the smaller task, as much of the larger under-
taken as is feasible. This is in fact the practice of wise city planners; for instance,
all good zoning is based on preliminary surveys, which are partial planning
studies.
FRANK B. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING 28 (1922).
49. The expanding scope of city planning is indicated by the statement of pur-
poses in the constitution of the American Institute of Planners [originally the
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LAND USE SYMPOSIUM
land use plan with the zoning ordinance, the zoning map, and
the official map was never entirely agreed upon."0 The elements
of a plan, that is, the subjects to be covered in it, have been
described in numerous ways as well. l
This review of the creation and early evolution of the land
use system establishes that it was enigmatic at inception. There
was little agreement as to most of its critical details.52 One clear
American City Planning Institute], as amended in 1946. It reads:
Its particular sphere of activity shall be the planning of the unified development of
urban communities and their environs, and of states, regions, and the nation, as
expressed through determination of the comprehensive arrangement of land uses
and land occupancy and the regulation thereof.
1 LEwis, supra note 15, at 6, 8.
50. "[Bassett] pointed out that 'a master plan cannot take the place of an official
map, although it may help to co-ordinate items in that instrument.'" Id. at 54 (citing
and quoting BASSETT, supra note 39, at 11-44, 69). The SPEA itself caused confusion for
localities that wanted to have their official map separate from their master plan.
[Tihe master plan is... called an official plan. It is contemplated that the official
map and master plan shall not be two documents but one. Somewhat later the
master plan is referred to repeatedly as the official master plan, the distinction
being made between the master plan before it has been translated in whole or part
into a precise plan through its adoption by the council and the same master plan
after it has been made precise and so adopted.
BASSETT, supra note 39, at 85 (emphasis added).
51. Lewis divided the comprehensive plan into six principal, non-exclusive elements
that included: (1) "The pattern of land uses;" (2) the mass-transportation system; (3)
public facilities for the fast movement of passengers and goods; (4) "the street system;"
(5) the park and recreational system; and (6) "the location of public buildings." 1 LEWIS,
supra note 15, at 54-55. In 1928, the SPEA set forth suggested elements of comprehen-
sive plans. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 329. Edward M. Bassett
listed zoning districts, streets, public building sites, public reservations, parks, public
utility routes, and bulkhead and pierhead lines as elements of planning. 1 LEwIS, supra
note 15, at 54. One architect categorized the comprehensive plan into twelve areas of
study: "streets; transportation of people; transportation of goods; factories and ware-
houses; food supply and markets; water supply and sanitation; housing; recreation; parks;
boulevards and tree planting; architecture; laws and financing." Id. at 53. The city plan
should contain and harmonize many elements including the streets, parks, and mass
transportation. Additionally, it should address "the subdivision of building land and the
regulation of the height, area with relation to the size of lot, and use of structures on it."
WILLIAMS, supra note 48, at 27.
52. Note how this lack of agreement persists. The Model Land Development Code
makes planning optional, except when local governments want to enact certain sophisti-
cated development controls. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 3-101 nn.1-3 (1976). The Ameri-
can Bar Association's Advisory Commission on Housing and Urban Growth recom-
mended that local governments be mandated to undertake comprehensive planning. See
HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 408-10. It was not until the 1992 legisla-
tive session that the state legislature in Connecticut passed a statute requiring that local
zoning regulations "consider" the local plan of development. 1992 CONN. LEGIS. SERV.
19931
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conclusion emerges, however. The framers of the system wanted
those involved in its implementation to carry on a conversation
about the goals and objectives of land use regulation. This con-
versation was to touch on, at a minimum, the major public inter-
est issues affected by land use. It was to be carried on at the
appropriate level and in requisite detail to confront the chal-
lenges of the day. This conversation, call it comprehensive land
use planning, can be civil and productive because it is removed
from the rancorous debate over specific regulations and particu-
lar projects. Whether we are abiding by this vision of land use
planning is the key question for lawmakers in New York to
consider."3
D. Challenges to Local Land Use Control in New York State
In New York, there has been little effort to eliminate the
confusion that surrounded the birth and early development of
the national system of local land use control. 4 This confusion is
compounded by the complex challenges of a more interdepen-
dent society threatened by environmental deterioration and eco-
nomic stagnation. Despite clear evidence of our regional interde-
pendence and the need for a more integrated and cost-effective
system, local officials still determine the shape and pace of land
development, decide the economic fate of land owners and act as
the stewards of our natural resources. The system of local con-
trol of land use has remained relatively unburdened by clear
160-61 (West) (Public Act 92-50, amending CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-6 (West 1992)).
53. See supra notes 8-10.
54. In 1970, one of the first state-wide comprehensive planning bills in the country
was introduced in the New York Senate. Senate Bill 9028 called for state-wide compre-
hensive planning, regional plans and county plans, all compatible and consistent with
one another. S. 9028, 193rd Leg. Sess. §§ 3-106(2), 3-104, 4-101, 4-102(1)(c) (1970).
County plans were to direct development into high density areas and away from agricul-
tural and rural lands. Id. § 3-301. Local governments were to exercise their land use
authority in conformance with the county plans. Id. § 3-106(2). These provisions would
have established an integrated state-wide land use system of the type that was eventu-
ally adopted in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 186.001-187.201 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993)
(Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972 and the State Comprehensive Plan),
and Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-860 (1991) (Comprehensive Land Use Planning
Coordination). The reaction against S. 9028 was so strong that the bill failed to reach the
full Senate, see 1970 N.Y. LEGis. REC. & INDEX S. 677, and the administrative agency that
proposed it was disbanded by the legislature shortly thereafter, 1971 N.Y. LAWS ch. 75,
§ 11 (eliminating the New York Office of Planning Coordination).
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planning directives since it was created by the state legislature
over seven decades ago. It is, however, under siege. Its strength
is being sapped by preemptive state and federal regulations;5 5 it
is being attacked in the courts and a sympathetic ear has been
given to complaints that the system is not working.5 6
Twenty-one years ago, in Golden v. Planning Board57 the
New York Court of Appeals called on the state legislature to
adopt a system of "[s]tate-wide or regional control of [land use]
planning" to "insure that interests broader than that of the mu-
nicipality underlie various land use policies. '15  The state's high-
est court minced no words in 1972, when confronted by a growth
control ordinance adopted by a single municipality in a growing
county. It stated that New York's zoning enabling legislation "is
burdened by the largely antiquated notion which deigns that the
55. See John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of
State Interests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497 (1993); see also the
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-
0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993). SEQRA requires that all public agency
decisions that affect land use be subjected to a thorough review of their impact on the
environment. Id. § 8-0109(2). The range of actions subject to such review is extensive,
making the scope of SEQRA nearly coextensive with the scope of land use regulation
itself. See id.; see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 1984) (defining
environment as "the physical conditions which will be affected by a proposed action,
including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic
significance, existing patterns of population concentration, distribution, or growth, and
existing community or neighborhood character."). Under SEQRA, public agencies are
authorized to perform Generic Environmental Impact Studies in advance of more partic-
ular decisions later on. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.15 (1987). This author-
ity is remarkably similar to the authority of local planning boards to adopt "comprehen-
sive master plans."
In this law, there is a built-in disincentive to carry out traditional comprehensive
planning. The SEQRA statute requires environmental planning, broadly defined, of all
individual land use actions, at the expense of the applicant. The regulations provide that
the cost of area-wide Generic Environmental Impact Studies may be imposed on later
applicants. Id. In this indirect way, the cost of land use planning may be transferred
from the public sector to the private sector. There is no requirement that such studies
conform to the local comprehensive plan. Id. Ironically, under existing case law, locally
and regionally adopted environmental impact studies can become part of the "relevant
evidence" courts look for in discovering the "comprehensive plan" with which zoning
actions must conform. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 471-72, 235 N.E.2d 897,
902, 288 N.Y.S.2d 895-96 (1968).
56. See infra notes 71 and 322.
57. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
58. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150; see also Berenson v. Town of
New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 (1975).
15
PACE LAW REVIEW
regulation of land use and development is uniquely a function of
local government." 59 Under this system of local control of land
use, "questions of broader public interest have commonly been
ignored." 60 The court referred to criticisms of community auton-
omy and commented that local land use control suffers from
"pronounced insularism" and produces "distortions in metropol-
itan growth patterns."'" It noted that local control had the effect
of "crippling efforts toward regional and [s]tate-wide problem
solving, be it pollution, decent housing, or public
transportation."62
In returning to this subject after twenty years, the court of
appeals recently confronted the costs of enigmatic land use plan-
ning in a dramatic setting. In Long Island Pine Barrens Society,
Inc. v. Planning Board,6 3 the court reversed a lower court deci-
sion that had delayed 224 development projects, valued at over
$11 billion and containing more than 12,000 housing units.6 4 The
appellate division had held that the three towns in which these
projects were located must review the cumulative effect of these
projects on the drinking water aquifer under the State Environ-
mental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). 5
The court of appeals disagreed, noting simply that "[h]ere,.
there is no plan .... 6 6 It found that a general governmental
policy, contained in a host of local, state and federal laws,
designed to protect the drinking water aquifer was not the same
thing as a land use plan.6 7 Such a plan is the predicate for re-
quiring an analysis of the cumulative effects of otherwise unre-
lated projects. The court echoed its earlier sentiments, stating
that "the existing system of land-use planning in the region is
plainly not equal to the massive undertaking that effective long-
range planning would require, and some other system devised by
59. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 374, 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
60. Id.
61. Id., 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. 80 N.Y.2d 500, 606 N.E.2d 1373, 591 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1992).
64. See Josh Barbanel, Court Halts Projects Planned for Pine Barrens, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1992, at B1.
65. Long Island Pine Barrens Soc'y, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 178 A.D.2d 18, 29-30, 581
N.Y.S.2d 803, 809-10 (2d Dep't 1992).
66. Pine Barrens, 80 N.Y.2d at 514, 606 N.E.2d at 1379, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
67. Id. at 514-15, 606 N.E.2d at 1379, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
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a larger planning entity must be substituted." 68 The state's high-
est court referred this matter of "urgent public concern" to the
state legislature just as it did twenty years ago.69
The essential criticism of the land-use planning system is
that local officials cannot respond to the complex needs of rap-
idly developing regions or manage the escalating conflict be-
tween economic development and environmental preservation.
Curiously, the critics have taken their frustrations to the courts
instead of their state legislators, the gatekeepers of this now an-
cient citadel. While no meaningful reform proposals have been
discussed in Albany, the courts have been besieged by com-
plaints.70 The numerous suits brought by environmentalists to
block development have been countered by an equal number of
actions by landowners alleging that land use restrictions violate
due process or effect a taking of property without just
compensation. 1
Under the statutory scheme in New York, the primary
method of controlling the pace and shape of land development is
the local zoning ordinance. As can be seen readily, the land use
law in New York closely parallels, and shares the enigmatic na-
ture of, the historic system described above. The city, town and
village laws all decree that such zoning regulations shall be in
accordance with a comprehensive plan.73 In other words, zoning
must be consistent with local planning. This requirement makes
obvious sense; how else are courts to judge whether a regulation
properly advances the public welfare? 4 Paralleling the national
system, however, the local planning board is not required to
68. Id. at 516, 606 N.E.2d at 1380, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
69. Id. at 517-18, 606 N.E.2d at 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
70. See supra note 54, and infra notes 71, 86, and 87.
71. Developer suits of this type are so numerous that they have been characterized
as a "movement." See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Environmental Laws Face Stiff Test From
Landowners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al.
72. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(24) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKin-
ney 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700 (McKinney 1973).
73. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263 (McKin-
ney 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993).
74. "[Tlhe comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be no
rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is being served
and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll." Udell v. Haas,
21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893-94 (1968).
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adopt a plan.75 State law merely provides that local planning
boards may adopt "a comprehensive master plan" for the com-
munity.7 6 Thus, land use planning in New York is discretionary;
this is the enigma of mandatory congruency and discretionary
planning. How can zoning ordinances be required to conform to
local plans when planning itself is not required? The enigma is
compounded in the state statutes' delegation of planning and
zoning authority to different local bodies. Plans are to be
adopted by an appointed planning board while zoning ordi-
nances are to be adopted by the elected legislative assembly.7
7
E. The "Land Use Plan" - An Illusory Concept
The mystery of the land use system in New York is height-
ened by the lack of clear statutory guidance. The law contains
no definition of what a land use plan is or what it must contain.
Under current law, zoning ordinances must be in conformance
with "a comprehensive plan" yet planning boards are given the
authority to adopt "a comprehensive master plan." 8 These
terms are not the same and they are not clearly defined by the
very statutes that place so much legal emphasis on them.
The statutes offer no definition of a "comprehensive plan"
at all. Only a partial definition of the "comprehensive master
plan" is provided. "9 The legislature has stipulated that a com-
75. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 28-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993) (repealed effective
July 1, 1994, by 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 209); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (McKinney 1987 &
Supp. 1993) (repealed effective July 1, 1994, b'y 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 209); N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW § 7-722 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993) (repealed effective July 1, 1994, by 1993
N.Y. Laws ch. 209). The legislature repealed these provisions in 1993, adding new lan-
guage that defines a "comprehensive plan" and gives the local legislative body, rather
than the planning board, the authority to adopt a comprehensive plan, in its discretion.
This new law goes into effect on July 1, 1994. 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 209 (to be codified at
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 28-a, N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §7-722).
76. See supra note 39.
77. See supra note 39.
78. Compare N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 1989), and N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 263 (McKinney 1987), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993)
(using "comprehensive plan"), with N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 28-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp.
1993), and N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1993), and N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW § 7-722 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993) (using "comprehensive master plan"). See
supra note 75.
79. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1993). The legisla-
ture, in 1993, added a definition of the comprehensive plan in the changes made to the
Town, Village and General City Laws referenced in footnote 75, supra. That definition is
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prehensive master plan show desirable public facilities such as
streets, parks, and public buildings. The content of such a plan
has not been limited, but it must provide for capital facilities at
a minimum. The lack of clear definitions in the origins of this
system has not been corrected by legislation in New York.80
In the absence of a legislative definition of the comprehen-
sive plan to which zoning must conform, the judiciary has been
called frequently to probe this mystery. Judicial decisions have
provided the following guidelines:
* Zoning can be legal even in the absence of a written plan.81
* The statutes are satisfied if, implicit in the zoning ordinance
itself, there is evidence of rational planning.82
* Once a plan is adopted, it does not have to be kept current.
In such cases, courts will not require "slavish servitude to any
as follows:
As used in this section, the term "[town, village, or city] comprehensive plan"
means the materials, written and/or graphic, including but not limited to maps,
charts, studies, resolutions, reports and other descriptive material that identify
the goals, objectives, principles, guidelines, policies, standards, devices and instru-
ments for the immediate and long-range protection, enhancement, growth and de-
velopment of the [town, village or city]. The [town, village or city] comprehensive
plan as herein defined, shall, among other things, serve as a basis for land use
regulation, infrastructure development, public and private investment, and any
plans which may detail one or more topics of a [town, village or city] comprehen-
sive plan.
See, e.g., 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 209, § 1. The law also lists 15 topics that "may" be in-
cluded in a comprehensive plan. This new law has several apparent effects. It eliminates
the discretionary authority of planning boards to adopt a "comprehensive master plan,"
rendering the planning board's role in planning ambiguous. It gives the legislative body
the discretion to adopt a "comprehensive plan," harmonizing planning terminology with
zoning terminology, since zoning must be in conformance with a "comprehensive plan."
See supra note 73. The law may broaden the effects of the comprehensive plan, noting
that it "shall serve" as the basis for "land use regulation" not just zoning. However, after
July 1, 1994, when these new provisions go into effect, planning will still be discretionary.
What is to be included in a plan is also discretionary, and the historic role of the plan-
ning board in the process is now unclear. Contrast this to the laws of about half the
states that require local government to adopt plans, define certain elements that must be
included in a plan, outline the roles of local agencies with clarity and require localities to
keep their plan up to date.
80. See infra note 86 regarding proposed legislation to define the comprehensive
plan.
81. See Daum v. Meade, 65 Misc. 2d 572, 318 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1971).
82. See Randolph v. Town of Brookhaven, 37 N.Y.2d 544, 337 N.E.2d 763, 375
N.Y.S.2d 315 (1975).
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particular comprehensive plan," but look rather for "compre-
hensiveness of planning."" s
In the absence of any plan or the presence of an out-dated
one, courts will "examin[e] all relevant evidence" of compre-
hensive planning found in previous land use decisions of the
locality, including the zoning ordinance itself 4 The circular
and confusing nature of these judicial definitions is obvious.
They stand for the general proposition that zoning must serve
the public interest and that some expression of that interest,
independent of the zoning enactment itself, is desirable, but
not always necessary. This tepid expression of the require-
ment that zoning be "in accordance with" the comprehensive
plan falls far short of a mandate to adopt a comprehensive
plan before adopting land use regulations as several state leg-
islatures have required.85
F. Zoning - A Flexible and Illusive Tool
Another consequence of vague statutory language is that
zoning in New York has evolved into a flexible, if unpredictable,
method of land use regulation. The land use statutes in New
York do not define "comprehensive plan. '" Until very recently,
they did not define a "variance," a "site plan," a "special use
83. See Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 188, 306 N.E.2d
155, 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 136 (1973).
84. See Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 471-72, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96.
85. To some degree, the legislatures or courts of at least the following states require
local governments to adopt a comprehensive plan before they are authorized to under-
take specified forms of land use regulation: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-461 and
9-461.01 to 9-461.12 (1990 & Supp. 1992); California, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West
1983); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2651-61, 4951-61, 6951-61 (1989); Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3167(2), 163.3194 (West 1990); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-4 (1985
& Supp. 1992); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6508, 67-6511 (1989 & Supp. 1992); see also
Dawson Enters., Inc. v. Blaine County, 567 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Idaho 1977) (dictum); Ken-
tucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 100:183, 100.201(2) (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1992); Maine,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4314(1)-(3), 4321-27, 4352 (West Supp. 1992); Mon-
tana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-101 to 76-1-606, 76-2-101 to 76-2-412 (1993); Nebraska,
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-401 to 14-403, 15-1101 to 15-1106, 19-901, 23-174.01 to .09 (1991);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1992), see also Pop
Realty Corp. v. Springfield Bd. of Adjustment, 423 A.2d 688 (N.J. Super. 1980); Oregon,
OR. REV. STAT. § 215.050 (1991); see also Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772 (Or.
1975); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-22.2-1 to 45-22.2-14 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
86. For a definition of "comprehensive plan" that will take effect in 1994, see supra
note 79.
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permit," "transfer of development rights," or "incentive zoning,"
to name just five of a variety of zoning techniques that have
been used for decades at the local level.87 As a direct result of
this lack of definition, what constitutes zoning has been the sub-
ject of much debate. The conservative view is that zoning is a
rigid, district bound technique and that the precise rules must
be set down in advance of development. Land use attorneys fre-
quently state, for example, that zoning can control the "use" but
not the "user" of property.8 These observations are logically de-
rived from basic due process notions.
If this view is correct, how do we explain court decisions
that have articulated the following rules?
* Zoning districts can be created and "float" subject to a re-
quest by a qualifying landowner for their application to his
property. 9
* In proper cases, zoning can specify the attributes of people
who can build, own, and live in certain types of
developments.9 0
* Rezoning can be conditioned on the development meeting re-
quirements demonstrably within the public interest, but not
contained in the ordinance itself.91
* Uses can be permitted by special permit, also subject to such
87. Several of these terms have been defined by amendments to the town and village
laws due to the work of the New York State Legislative Commission on Rural Resources.
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1993) (defining "variances"); N.Y. TOWN LAW §274-a(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-725-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (defining "site
plan"); N.Y. TOWN LAW §274-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
725-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (defining "special use permit"); N.Y. TOWN LAW §261-
a(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-701(1)(d) (McKinney Supp.
1993) (defining "transfer of development rights"); N.Y. TOWN LAW §261-b(1)(e) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-703(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (defining
"incentive zoning"); see James A. Coon and Sheldon W. Damsky, Revisions to State
Zoning Laws Enacted, MUN. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 1; Terry Rice, Statutory Changes
Provide for Incentive Zoning, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 1991, at 40.
88. See Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., 146 A.2d 257, 260 (N.H. 1958)
("[Z]oning conditions and regulations are designed to regulate the land itself and its use
and not the person who owns and operates the premises by whom such use is to be
exercised.").
89. See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
90. See Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1975).
91. See Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866
(1960).
1993]
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
conditions.2
* Waivers of requirements can be given in the interest of
achieving a planned unit development, integrating diverse
land uses in an otherwise single-use district.9 3
• Variances from zoning requirements may be granted if the
"spirit" of the law is not violated by them. 4
The lack of clarity and definition in New York land law has
enabled local officials to invent this impressive array of "zoning"
tools. These devices have been sustained by the courts when
they meet the illusive requirement of being in accordance with
the comprehensive plan. 5 In sustaining Tarrytown's adoption of
a "floating zone," for example, the New York Court of Appeals
sanctioned inventive zoning with these words: "If, therefore, an
ordinance is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive zoning
plan, it is not 'spot zoning,' even though it (1) singles out and
affects but one small plot . . . or (2) creates in the center of a
large zone small areas or districts devoted to a different use."96
Judge Conway, in dissent, was incredulous that Tarrytown could
create a zoning technique so at odds with traditional Euclidian
zoning, which emphasizes the rigid separation of land uses. He
characterized Tarrytown's action as "unprecedented," "most as-
suredly not 'zoning,'" "unauthorized by the Village Law of this
State, which is the sole source of the board's power to act," "at
odds with all sound zoning theory and practice" and "the open-
ing wedge in the destruction of effective and efficient zoning in
this State." 97
In the absence of clear rules and definitions to guide local
land use control, local regulators have enjoyed great flexibility to
act to respond to emergent needs. This has been the singular
strength of the historic land use system. The advantage of this
flexibility, the diversity of local needs in New York, the strength
92. See Penny Arcade, Inc. v. Town Bd., 75 A.D.2d 620, 427 N.Y.S.2d 52 (2d Dep't
1980).
93. See Ahearn v. Zoning Bd. of App., 158 A.D.2d 801, 551 N.Y.S.2d 392 (3d Dep't),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 706, 561 N.E.2d 888, 560 N.Y.S.2d 988
(1990).
94. See Aucello v. Moylan, 60 Misc. 2d 1094, 304 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Westches-
ter County 1969).
95. See supra note 73 and text accompanying.
96. Rodgers, 302 N.Y. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735 (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 126-27, 96 N.E.2d at 736 (Conway, J., dissenting).
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of the "home rule" tradition, 98 and the difficulty of altering de
facto patterns of regulation are but a few reasons that explain
why the state legislature has proceeded with caution in re-
forming this system.
G. Local Zoning is Required to Respect Regional Needs
It is perhaps the failure of local land use regulation to con-
sider its inter-municipal impacts, and the lack of any technique
that requires an accounting for them, that call most convincingly
for reform. The courts have required that local zoning consider
regional needs. 9  For two decades New York's highest court has
urged the legislature to reform the land use system to facilitate
such consideration. °" Its decisions reflect these propositions:
" That growth naturally occurring in the private market must
be accommodated by localities, subject to reasonable growth
management requirements.'01
* That meeting the needs of the people of the state generally
must be an objective of local land use regulation; the welfare
of the landowners and citizens within the geographical
boundaries of the community is not the sole end of land use
regulation.'02
* That local governments are not competent, by themselves, to
measure regional needs and decide how to accommodate
them. 10 3
" That state and regional agencies should articulate such needs
and explain to local governments the extent to which they
98. For an explanation of the very limited extent to which local "home rule" power
constrains the state legislature from acting in the land use area, see Nolon, supra note
55.
99. See, e.g., Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681;
Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
100. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text; see also Pine Barrens, 80
N.Y.2d at 517-18, 606 N.E.2d at 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 990; Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111,
341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682; Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 301,
334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
101. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 377-79, 285 N.E.2d at 301-02, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151-53; see
also, Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1957).
102. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
103. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 375-76, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149-50.
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must meet such needs. 104
These judicial tenets reflect the notion that, since local zon-
ing authority is derived from the state's police power, zoning
must be exercised with the broader interests of the state in
mind.10 5 How these broader interests are to be articulated, and
localities to be accountable to them, is the key question of land
law reform in New York. Although the state legislature has be-
gun the reform process by adding needed definitions and clarity
to the law, this issue has yet to be addressed in any meaningful
and formal way.106
H. Legislative Inaction
What the state legislature has not done is now easier to
evaluate. The list of omissions is impressive:
Cogent planning regions of the* state have not been
104. Pine Barrens, 80 N.Y.2d at 516, 606 N.E.2d at 1380, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 989; Ber-
enson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682; Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at
376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
105. For example, the court in Berenson stated:
[I]n enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given to regional needs
and requirements .... Although we are aware of the traditional view that zoning
acts only upon the property lying within the zoning board's territorial limits, it
must be recognized that zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the bounda-
ries of the municipality.
Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
106. For a recent statutory amendment that promotes intergovernmental coopera-
tion among local governments regarding land use planning and regulation, see 1992 N.Y.
LAWS ch. 724 (codified at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney Supp. 1993), N.Y. TOWN
LAW § 284 (McKinney Supp. 1993), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney Supp.
1993)). Area-wide land use plans may be adopted by county governments, but few have
entered the field. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-d (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993). The
legal effect of county land use plans is not clearly defined, although court decisions give
them a presumption of legislative validity, if adopted by the county legislature. Blitz v.
Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1983). Counties may
comment on local actions which affect land proximate to county facilities and municipal
boundaries, but the effect of their negative comment is only to require a majority plus
one vote on the matter at the local level. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-m (McKinney 1986
& Supp. 1993). It is hard to tell whether this is helpful or simply a further complication,
particularly in the absence of a county land use plan. For a complete discussion of the
statutory history of regional and county authority in New York, see generally Patricia E.
Salkin, Regional Planning in New York State: A State Rich in National Models, Yet
Weak in Overall Statewide Planning Coordination, 13 PACE L. REV. 505 (1993). For a
national review of trends in regional governance, including a discussion of regional regu-
latory agencies, see generally John Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan Ar-
eas: Voter Resistance and Reform Persistence, 13 PACE L. REV. 449 (1993).
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delineated.
* Regional needs have not been identified.
* The extent of local responsibility for accommodating such
needs has not been articulated.
* Local planning is not required or seriously encouraged even in
areas of the state undergoing development pressure or where
critical natural resources exist.
* What a local plan is and what it must include have not been
defined.
* There is no administrative review of whether local plans are
consistent with state-wide or regional objectives.107
I. The Vulnerability of Land Use Regulations to Attack
As a result of these legal incongruities, zoning and other
regulations designed to control growth or to protect the environ-
ment are vulnerable to attack.' °8 As demonstrated above, land
use planning is the historical basis of land use regulation. The
two were designed, however unartfully, to go together. Planning
insulated regulation from the pressures of politics. It provided a
reasonable basis for limitations on the use of private land in the
public interest. It follows that when regulations are adopted
without reference to planning objectives or, worse, are contrary
to such objectives, they are vulnerable to attack. If planning is
not done, if it is not specific, or if it is not up to date, and if
regulations are not buoyed by the plan, the base on which land
use regulations rest is infirm. This makes a strong case for fun-
damental reform of the legislative system under which land use
regulations operate.
In the litigious climate created by the clash in society be-
tween property rights advocates and land regulators, regulating
107. A number of states with land use systems similar to New York's have reformed
the law by establishing a more coherent and integrated system. These reforms tend to
eliminate the deficiencies in the New York system that are listed here. See Douglas R.
Porter, State Growth Management: The Intergovernmental Experiment, 13 PACE L.
REV. 481, 484-500 (1993); Henry R. Richmond, From Sea to Shining Sea: Manifest
Destiny and the National Land Use Dilemma, 13 PACE L. REV. 327, 347-50 (1993); supra
note 85.
108. So much litigation has been brought contesting the validity of local land use
regulation that this activity in the courts has been called a "movement." SCHNEIDER,
supra note 71, at Al.
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in a planning void is inadvisable.10 9 This is particularly so in
light of personal liability suits brought against regulators and
their agencies. 110 In the next part, this article examines how the
failure to honor the "in accordance with" provision of the land
law can subject regulations to a variety of attacks by aggrieved
property owners.
III. Failure to Plan Subjects Land Use Regulations to Attack
A. An Illustrative Case
In Udell v. Haas,"' a property owner contested the reclas-
sification of his property from a business to a residential use by
the Village of Lake Success on Long Island. The court began its
analysis, as it should, by looking for the village's comprehensive
plan. It understood that "the comprehensive plan is the essence
of zoning." 1 ' The court noted two defects in land use regulation
that occur when comprehensive planning is missing. The first
was that "[w]ithout [a plan], there can be no rational allocation
of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is being
served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just
a Gallup poll."'1' 3 The second was that "the 'comprehensive plan'
protects the landowner from arbitrary restrictions on the use of
his property which can result from the pressures which outraged
voters can bring to bear on public officials." 1 4
Lake Success had not adopted a "comprehensive master
109. In the absence of a cogent plan which ties land use regulations to clearly stated
public objectives, developers and landowners can not know what to develop and where;
courts find it difficult to judge the reasonableness of local regulations. This lack of guid-
ance begins to explain why land use regulation is so tedious, expensive and time
consuming.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) ("Every person who, under color of any statute . . .
subject[s]. ... any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .... ").
111. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
112. Id. at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893. The court also references
"[tihe almost universal statutory requirement that zoning conform to a 'well considered
plan'... . (See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, U.S. Dept. of Commerce [1926]
(sic))." Id., 235 N.E.2d at 900, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
113. Id., 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94.
114. Id., 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894. "[T]here is a danger that zoning,
considered as a self-contained activity rather than as a means to a broader end, may
tyrannize individual property owners." Id. (quoting Charles M. Haar, In Accordance
With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1157-58 (1955)).
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plan;" therefore, there was no single document that could consti-
tute a "comprehensive plan." '15 As a result, the court was forced
to deal with the enigmatic nature of the New York State land
use system. Since planning is not required, and what constitutes
a plan is not specified by law, the court had to define a judicial
strategy for determining whether this rezoning conformed, as re-
quired, to a comprehensive plan."1 6
This was the moment in the historical development of New
York's planning law for the highest court to determine how to
interpret the "in accordance with" requirement. Did the zoning
ordinance itself constitute the plan?1 1 7 Did zoning have to con-
form to a separate, independent, comprehensive planning docu-
ment? '8 Was evidence of comprehensive planning in the adop-
tion of zoning enough to satisfy the requirement? 9
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by "examining all
relevant evidence."' °2 0 In the absence of an adopted plan, it
looked at the zoning ordinance and zoning map for evidence of
comprehensive planning.' 2' It also reviewed a 1958 zoning
amendment that was entitled a "development policy" for the vil-
lage.1 1 2 This policy articulated a vision of the village as a low-
density, single-family community with commercial development
only in peripheral areas.' 23 The plaintiff's land was in such an
area and had been classified by the zoning ordinance, prior to
the contested rezoning, as business property.'
4
Having discovered the plan for the community in this piece-
meal fashion, adopting in the process the "evidence of compre-
hensive planning" standard for interpreting the "in accordance
115. Id., 21 N.Y.2d at 472, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
116. Id. at 472-76, 235 N.E.2d at 902-05, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896-99.
117. For an early New York case taking this view, see Harris v. Village of Dobbs
Ferry, 208 A.D. 853, 204 N.Y.S. 325 (2d Dep't 1924). This case was decided before the
adoption of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act. See supra note 29.
118. See, e.g., Fasno v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
119. See Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 104 A.2d 7 (Pa. 1970).
120. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 471, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895. Development
policies "may be garnered from any available source, most especially the master plan of
the community, if any has been adopted, the zoning law itself and the zoning map." Id.
at 472, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 472-73, 235 N.E.2d at 902-03, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
124. Id. at 466-67, 235 N.E.2d at 899, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92.
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with" requirement, 2 ' it was not hard for the court to determine
that the rezoning, which diminished plaintiff's property value by
sixty percent, was not in conformance with comprehensive plan-
ning. 2 ' In constitutional terms, the land use action of the'village
violated substantive due process;127 it was not designed to ac-
complish a valid public objective. 28 In statutory terms, the ac-
tion was beyond the powers of the village since it did not con-
form to the plan.'29 "Hence [the] ordinance ... must be held to
be ultra vires'30 as not meeting the requirements of ... the Vil-
lage Law that zoning be 'in conformance with a comprehensive
plan.',,31
The plaintiff also complained that the reclassification of his
land was discriminatory.1 32 The court used a narrow inquiry to
review this allegation. "The issue is the propriety of the treat-
ment of the subject parcel as compared to neighboring proper-
ties. 13 3 The evidence provided by the plaintiff established that
other similarly situated properties were allowed to be used for
business uses, leading the court to agree that the rezoning was
discriminatory. 34 Discrimination, said the court, "is a wrong
125. Id. at 472, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896. This interpretation of the
"in accordance with" requirement is that there must exist evidence of comprehensive
planning in the adoption of zoning, which would satisfy the requirement. See supra note
116.
New York has never interpreted its statute (which follows the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act) to require the adoption of an independent comprehensive plan, but
has been willing to find the land-use policies of a community in a comprehensive
plan, if one exists, as well as in the zoning ordinance and zoning map.
HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 364 (Richard P. Fishman ed., 1978) (citing UdeU, 21
N.Y.2d at 471-72, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895).
126. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 904-05, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
127. See infra notes 150-175 and accompanying text.
128. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 475-76, 235 N.E.2d at 904-05, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99.
129. Id. at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899. "Such [zoning] regulations
shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan .... " N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704
(McKinney 1973).
130. The Latin phrase "ultra vires" (beyond the power) is frequently used by the
courts to characterize a local land use regulation taken outside of the local government's
authority. See, e.g., Moriarty v. Planning Bd., 119 A.D.2d 188, 196, 506 N.Y.S.2d 184, 189
(2d Dep't 1986), infra notes 201-06.
131. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 476-77, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900.
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done to the community's land use control scheme."'' 35
The court also found fault with the process by which the
rezoning was accomplished. It wrote, "the process by which a
zoning revision is carried out is important in determining . . .
[its] validity .... 11' The facts showed that the development
policies of the community were clear when, on the morning of
June 21, 1960, the plaintiff's representative appeared at the vil-
lage offices with a plan for the business development of the
property.13 7 That evening, the village planning board recom-
mended a change in zoning from business to residential use.138
Within a month, the rezoning was accomplished. 13 9
The court characterized this process as a "rush to the stat-
ute books, '"'4  and found that the rezoning was not "accom-
plished in a proper, careful and reasonable manner."'' "The
amendment was not the result of a deliberate change in commu-
nity policy and was enacted without sufficient forethought or
planning.' 4 2 This amounted to a violation of procedural guaran-
tees. Planning is more than the substantive result. It is also a
process, aptly described by the court as careful, reasonable and
deliberate. 14 3 The failure to plan properly in Lake Success led to
a finding that the rezoning violated procedural due process
guarantees. 144
The village's failure to conform its regulation of the plain-
tiff's land to its comprehensive plan led to the invalidation of
the contested action on four separate grounds. It did not meet
either substantive 1 5 or procedural due process tests, 4 6 it was
135. Id. at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899. See infra notes 187-99 and
accompanying text.
136. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 474, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
137. Id. at 473, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97.
138. Id., 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 474, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
141. Id. at 475, 235 N.E.2d at 904, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (quoting Rodgers v. Village
of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 122, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1951)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 469-70, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
144. Id. at 474, 235 N.E.2d at 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 903. See infra notes 176-86 and
text accompanying.
145. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
146. Id. at 473-74, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97.
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beyond the village's legal authority, 47 and it was discriminatory,
in violation of the plaintiff's equal protection rights. s
The message is clear. Over thirty years ago, the courts gave
landowners a checklist to use in analyzing whether land use ac-
tions are proper. 49 All of them emanate from the land use plan.
If a plan is developed in an orderly way, if it is reasonable, and
if it can be shown that the regulation achieves one of its objec-
tives, it is likely that a contested regulation will withstand at-
tack on all four of these grounds. Each of these lines of attack
on a land use regulation and how the failure to meet the "in
accordance with" requirement can be fatal to a regulation are
explored in greater depth in the material that follows.
B. Substantive Due Process
The Udell case demonstrates that a land use regulation
must not be arbitrary or capricious; it must be reasonably re-
lated to the achievement of a valid public purpose to comply
with substantive due process guarantees of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution. 5 ' In the seminal zoning case,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 5 1 the U.S. Supreme
Court established the standard of review to be used by the
courts when the wisdom of a regulatory scheme is challenged on
147. Id. at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
148. Id. at 477, 235 N.E.2d at 906, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
149. See supra notes 145-48 and text accompanying. The checklist is developed by
the court in its substantive review of the four charges made by the plaintiff in Udell v.
Haas.
150. The Fifth Amendment states that "no person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. A similar limita-
tion on government action is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In New York, this "due process" requirement is contained in
the New York Constitution, using language virtually identical to that of the U.S. Consti-
tution. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Due process has been characterized as both substantive
and procedural. Substantive due process is concerned with the essential fairness of the
action of government. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990). In the property reg-
ulation field, the issues are whether the regulation is designed to accomplish a valid pub-
lic purpose and is reasonable and fair. Procedural due process concerns the "process"
that is followed in the adoption of regulations that affect property rights. Apart from the
substantive content of the regulation, it must be adopted and administered in a way that
treats affected interests fairly, giving them notice and a reasonable chance to be heard
before an accessible and impartial tribunal. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 58-60
(2d ed. 1988).
151. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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due process grounds. "[T]he reasons [must be] sufficiently co-
gent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the
ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial re-
lation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 15
Failure to conform with a comprehensive plan risks violating
this standard of review.
In McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay,'53 the substantive due
process tests of a land use regulation were reviewed. The case is
a reminder that a land use regulation must meet a two part test
to satisfy substantive due process. First, the zoning ordinance
"must have been enacted in furtherance of a legitimate govern-
mental purpose."' 5' Second, "there must be a reasonable rela-
tion between the end sought to be achieved by the regulation
and the means used to achieve that end. 1 155
The Oyster Bay zoning ordinance restricted the occupancy
of single-family housing to any number of persons related by
blood, marriage or adoption, or to two persons not so related but
who are sixty-two years of age or older.'56 The plaintiffs had
rented their four-bedroom home to four unrelated young men.
The dispositive issue was whether the zoning ordinance could
restrict the use of single-family homes in this fashion.' 51 The
Court of Appeals found that there was a "legitimate governmen-
tal purpose" in preserving the "character of traditional single-
152. Id. at 395. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962)
("Indulging in the usual presumption of constitutionality .... we find no indication that
the ... Ordinance ... is unconstitutional.... [T]his court has often said that 'debatable
questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature .. ' " (quot-
ing Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932))). This United States Supreme Court
standard of review has been adopted in New York for zoning cases challenged on due
process grounds:
[D]ecision as to how a community shall be zoned or rezoned, as to how various
properties shall be classified or reclassified, rests with the local legislative body; its
judgment and determination will be conclusive, beyond interference from the
courts, unless shown to be arbitrary, and.the burden of establishing such arbitrari-
ness is imposed upon him who asserts it.
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 121, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1951).
153. 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
154. Id. at 549, 488 N.E.2d at 1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
155. Id., 488 N.E.2d at 1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130-31.
156. Id. at 547-48, 488 N.E.2d at 1241-42, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
157. Id. at 547, 488 N.E.2d at 1241, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
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family neighborhoods, reduction of parking and traffic problems,
control of population density and prevention of noise and dis-
turbance.'158 However, the court found that the means of
achieving this purpose was not reasonably related to that end.
The provision was characterized as a violation of the plaintiff's
due process rights; as restrictions based on the size of the house-
hold were reasonably related to the achievement of the town's
legitimate purpose, but those based on the type of relations
among the occupants of a house were not.
159
In Kraizberg v. Shankey,160 the plaintiffs sought an exten-
sion of the existing town sewer district to serve their property,
but were denied based upon an alleged lack of capacity at the
town's central sewage plant and attendant infiltration and inflow
problems. The supreme court annulled the town board's denial
because the findings were not supported by the evidence. 61 The
appellate division affirmed this holding. In addition, the appel-
late division found that even though the town board had the
power to create sewer improvement districts, 162 its decision was
not based upon "a determination of the public interest but upon
the desire of town residents and the Board to minimize develop-
ment."16 3 The Board's determination was thus "arbitrary and
capricious," lacking support by substantial evidence.
6 4
In Walus v. Millington,6" the failure to show reasons for
deviating from the plan constituted spot zoning and was fatal to
the rezoning of an individual parcel.166 The plaintiffs challenged
the validity of a zoning ordinance reclassifying the defendant's
parcel from single-family residential to general business.
67
158. Id. at 549, 488 N.E.2d at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
159. Id.
160. 167 A.D.2d 370, 561 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2nd Dep't 1990).
161. Id. at 371, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
162. Id. (noting N.Y. TOWN LAW § 190 (McKinney 1987)).
163. Id; see also Town of Orangetown v. Magee, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1992, at 30 (Sup.
Ct. Rockland Co., Stolarik, J.) (reversing denial of a building permit because of clear
evidence that the denial was based on the local officials' desire to placate constituents
rather than to further legitimate public purposes).
164. Kraizberg, 167 A.D.2d at 371, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
165. 49 Misc. 2d 104, 266 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1966).
166. Id. at 108, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 389. See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y.
115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951) (single parcel rezoning is not illegal spot zoning if it is in
accord with sound planning principles); see infra notes 177-91 and text accompanying.
167. Walus, 49 Misc. 2d at 105, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
[Vol. 13:351
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/5
LAND USE SYMPOSIUM
Other than a few nonconforming uses within the general vicin-
ity, the area was primarily developed as a single-family residen-
tial neighborhood. The application for reclassification was to al-
low the construction of a restaurant and eventually a motel.16 8
The appellate division invalidated the rezoning because it
was not in accordance with the "comprehensive plan" of the
community. The court stated that "an underlying purpose [of
comprehensive planning is] to control land uses for the benefit
of the whole community based upon consideration of the com-
munity's problems and .. .a general policy to obtain a uniform
result."'6 9 In addition, "it requires a consideration of the indi-
vidual parcel's relationship to the community as a whole.'17 0
"[T]he requirement is that a plan be implicit in the zoning regu-
lation as a whole and that the amendments be consistent with
such [a] plan and not be enacted on a piecemeal or haphazard
basis.''7 Therefore, if the amendment benefits the community
as a whole, any incidental benefit or detriment to the owners or
neighboring property does not invalidate the legislation.
These three cases, McMinn, Kraizberg, and Walus, illus-
trate the vulnerability of regulations that are not clearly con-
nected to the advancement of an objective of a comprehensive
plan.17 2 In McMinn, there was no evidence that the regulatory
means chosen by the town advanced a valid planning objec-
tive. 7 3 In Kraizberg, the dangers of not integrating local plans,
such as the capital infrastructure budget, the official map and
the comprehensive plan were demonstrated. '7 In Walus, it was
fatal to a regulation that it was not part of the planning whole
but was instead enacted on a piecemeal or haphazard basis. 75 In
168. Id.
169. Id. at 108, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 839; see also Cannon v. Murphy, 600 N.Y.S.2d 965
(2d Dep't 1993).
170. Id. at 109, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 839 (citing Connell v. Town of Granby, 12 A.D.2d
177, 209 N.Y.S.2d 379 (4th Dep't 1961)).
171. Id.
172. See also South Gwinett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 837 (1974). "It necessarily follows that upon a factual showing of arbitrariness
there must be some basis in fact and law to justify the zoning action as consistent with
reasonableness." Id. at 7.
173. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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each of these cases, there was no evidence that the regulations
were enacted to further a specific public planning objective. The
courts in these cases cautioned municipalities from regulating in
the absence of conscientious planning.
C. Procedural Due Process
Land use regulations must adhere to procedural guarantees
secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. 176 Procedural due process concerns the
"process" that is followed in the adoption of regulations that af-
fect property rights. Apart from the substantive content of a
regulation, it must be adopted and administered in a way that
treats affected interests fairly, giving them notice and a reasona-
ble chance to be heard before a tribunal that is accessible and
impartial.
The failure of an agency to follow an orderly and logical
process in enacting a land use regulation can be fatal to a regula-
tion's validity. Recall that in Udell the rezoning was not "ac-
complished in a proper, careful and reasonable manner.' 1 77 Sim-
ilarly, in Pokoik v. Silsdorf,17 8 the town's dilatory tactics
resulted in the invalidation of the rezoning of plaintiff's prop-
erty. The plaintiff sought to annul the decision of the building
inspector and town zoning board of appeals that denied a build-
ing permit.1 79 The plaintiff's application for a building permit to
construct two additional bedrooms was originally rejected be-
cause of previous zoning violations.' 80 The plaintiff revised the
building plans, but the building inspector did not act upon
them. A court order compelling the building inspector's action
on the application was granted nine months later, but the appli-
cation was denied three months after issuance of the order.
81
The plaintiff appealed to the zoning board of appeals, but was
forced to reschedule the hearing because no one appeared on be-
176. See supra note 150.
177. See supra note 141.
178. 40 N.Y.2d 769, 358 N.E.2d 874, 390 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976).
179. Id. at 770, 358 N.E.2d at 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
180. Id. Plaintiff violated the zoning restrictions by renting rooms in a residential
district without a license. Moreover, the application for a building permit did not explain
why plaintiff needed the additional room. Thus, the application was rejected. Id.
181. Id.
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half of the town. Meanwhile, the town board of trustees
amended the zoning ordinance, limiting one-family residences to
four bedrooms. This was a new requirement that would be vio-
lated by the plaintiff's revised plans.'82 The ordinance became
effective prior to the plaintiff's hearing, resulting in the denial of
the building permit. The special term annulled this decision, but
the appellate division reversed, finding the amended ordinance
controlling because it was effective at the time of the hearing. 18
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the amended
ordinance could not apply, and finding that the dilatory tactics
of the town board and building inspector were a "special facts
exception" to the rule that zoning amendments may be made at
anytime in the public interest.84 The plaintiff's full compliance
with the zoning requirements at the time of the revised applica-
tion created a right to the permit. The plaintiff was denied his
right to begin construction before the effective date of the
amendment because of the "abuse of administrative procedure"
by the village officials. 5 The Court held that where a town
board has abused administrative procedures in amending its
zoning ordinance, that amendment may not be used to invali-
date an application for a permit.186
The faulty proceedings in Pokoik are symptomatic of what
happens when land use is regulated in the absence of systematic
planning, of clear objectives and of a determined and demon-
182. Id. at 771, 358 N.E.2d at 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
183. Id. at 772, 358 N.E.2d at 876, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
184. Id. at 772-73, 358 N.E.2d at 876, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
185. Id. at 773, 358 N.E.2d at 876, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
186. Id., 358 N.E.2d at 876-77, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 51-52; see also Golisano v. Town
Bd., 31 A.D.2d 85, 296 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dep't 1968). The absence of comprehensive
planning principles to justify a rezoning was transparent in the court's analysis of the
denial of the plaintiff's application for a building permit. The court noted that the town
board had cited fifteen reasons for denial of the permit, but these were "groping" and
without merit because no rationale for rezoning to increase the size of a building lot was
given. Id. at 88, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 626. The town board "abused administrative procedure"
by trying to conceal its desire to delay the application with insufficient reasons for de-
nial. Id. Due to this abuse, the court invoked the "special facts exception." Id. It held
that where a town board has abused administrative procedures in the exercise of its
zoning powers, this "special facts exception" will prevent a subsequent zoning amend-
ment from justifying a denial of the plaintiff's application for a permit. Id. Thus, the
amended ordinance did not apply and the arbitrary decision of the board was annulled.
Id., 296 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
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strable strategy to achieve them. Operating in a planning void
heightens the risk of having a court characterize the operating
method as dilatory and abusive, a violation of the guarantee of
procedural due process. This reinforces the historical reliance on
planning before regulation and proceeding according to that
plan.
D. Equal Protection Violation
Udell v. Haas further established that a land use regulation
may not discriminate unfairly against a particular owner or class
of owners in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 187 This
guarantee provides a landowner with the ability to attack the
validity of a land use regulation in two ways, either by attacking
the regulation on its face or by attacking the regulation as ap-
plied to a plaintiff's land.188
In Osiecki v. Town of Huntington,' 9 a regulation that de-
parted from the comprehensive plan was invalidated for failure
to articulate planning reasons for the deviation. In this 1991
case, the plaintiffs challenged the low-density residential classifi-
cation of their five and one-half acre parcel. The plaintiffs
claimed a violation of their equal protection rights, pointing to
nearby properties that were zoned and developed commercially
in conformance with a master plan adopted in 1965.190 The plan
designated the entire block, including the subject property, for
commercial development."8
187. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 477-78, 235 N.E.2d at 906, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01w The
Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law ... nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; see also N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 11. Owners may contest the regulation of
their property if they have evidence that similarly situated properties are not so affected.
Equal protection attacks may also be brought on other grounds, such as race, poverty or
age. Equal protection attacks on land use regulation are often intertwined with charges
that such regulations violate the plaintiff's constitutional due process rights. See
MANDELKER, supra note 150, at 61.
188. If there is no logical difference between plaintiff's property and an adjacent
property which was classified more favorably, then the regulation is attacked as applied
to plaintiff's land. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
189. 170 A.D.2d 490, 565 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dep't 1991).
190. Id. at 490, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
191. Id. at 491, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
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Using the vocabulary of other comprehensive plan cases, the
town argued that it was not obliged to "slavish servitude to the
master plan" and that it could change the use of the plaintiffs'
property. 192 A search of the record showed no reason articulated
by the town justifying a departure from the adopted plan. As a
result, the zoning of plaintiff's property was voided since it was
not in compliance with comprehensive planning. Otherwise,
"[t]o accept the Town's contention that it is free to determine
that the master plan should no longer be followed, without artic-
ulating a reason for that determination, would invite the kind of
ad hoc and arbitrary application of zoning power that the com-
prehensive planning requirement was designed to avoid."' 93
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc.,' 94 involved
a city ordinance that prevented a group home from being placed
in the community. The Court considered whether the mentally
retarded constituted a quasi-suspect class meriting an interme-
diate level of judicial scrutiny, somewhere between the strict
scrutiny applied to regulations affecting a constitutionally pro-
tected, or "suspect" class, and the rational relationship standard
applied to groups not specially protected by the Constitution. 9
The plaintiff sought to lease a building for operation as a
group home for mentally handicapped individuals. The city zon-
ing ordinance required an application for a special permit to es-
tablish a "hospital for the feebleminded."' 96 The plaintiff ap-
plied for a special permit, was denied and argued that the denial
violated equal protection and due process guarantees because
similar uses did not require a special permit.
The Supreme Court found that mental retardation was not
a "quasi-suspect classification" and refused to apply heightened
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne is a seminal federal case arising out of a zoning
dispute in Texas.
195. Id. at 435. Under the rational relationship standard, the most relaxed standard
of judicial review, the courts will uphold the land use scheme if there exists any rational
basis for its imposition upon the subject property. The rational relationship test is the
most common standard applied by the courts; because of the presumption of validity
given to regulations, it is infrequent that regulations are set aside when this standard is
used. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (6th ed. 1990).
196. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436-37.
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scrutiny to review the regulation.1 97 Instead, the Court stated
that "legislation that distinguishes between the mentally re-
tarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose." 9 " Using this standard, the Court found
that the special permit requirement violated equal protection
because other similar uses did not require such a special use per-
mit. Based on the proofs submitted, the Court found that there
was no rational basis for believing that the use would "pose any
special threat to the city's legitimate interests." 199 Again, the
failure to tie these matters to the objectives of a comprehensive
plan, and to show how they furthered such objectives, was fatal
to the regulation.
E. Ultra Vires
Finally, Udell demonstrated that the enactment of a land
use regulation must be within the powers that have been dele-
gated to the regulator through an enabling statute. °° In Mori-
arty v. Planning Board,0 1 the power of a planning board to re-
view a site plan was strictly construed, so as to deny the board
powers that were expressly granted to the building inspector.
In Moriarty, the plaintiff proposed to build a metal
fabricating plant on a vacant parcel of industrially-zoned prop-
erty. 2  The existing zoning ordinance required site plan ap-
proval by the village planning board before any building permit
could be issued. After submitting an application, the site plan
approval was denied because of inadequate fire protection mech-
anisms. The question on appeal was not the "reasonableness" of
the planning board's actions, but whether the planning board
was empowered to deny site plan approval because of fire pro-
203tection concerns.
The court, strictly interpreting the scope of delegated pow-
ers,20 4 found that the Planning Board was not empowered to
197. Id. at 442.
198. Id. at 446.
199. Id. at 448.
200. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94.
201. 119 A.D.2d 188, 506 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2d Dep't 1986).
202. Id. at 189, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
203. Id. at 189-90, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
204. The court held that:
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deny the building permit because fire code requirements were
not met. The court stated that "[z]oning laws are ... in deroga-
tion of common-law property rights and thus are subject to the
long-standing rule requiring their strict construction. 2 0 5 Be-
cause the state legislature did not empower the board to assume
the powers of local fire inspectors in denying building permits
due to inadequate fire protection, the court annulled the board's
denial of the application.20 8
Similarly, in Udell, the failure of the regulation to conform
to the comprehensive plan was sufficient to show that it was not
within the scope of the municipality's delegated powers.207 The
lessons taught by the courts in Udell and the cases cited above
strongly suggest that failing to conform land regulations to com-
prehensive planning enhances the success of all four lines of at-
tack available to property owners.
IV. The Planning Antidote to Legal Challenges of Land Use
Regulations
A. The Regulatory Takings Challenge: A Fifth Line of Attack
One important claim not advanced by the plaintiff in Udell
was that the rezoning of his property constituted a regulatory
taking. Similar claims are litigated so vigorously today that the
forces arrayed against land use regulations are classified as a
"movement. ' 208 Seeds of confusion in distinguishing a regulation
a planning board may not vary zoning regulations at all without explicitly being
delegated such power, nor may it deny site plan approval on the ground that the
proposed use is not permitted under the zoning ordinance because the power to
interpret the zoning ordinance is vested in the building inspector and the Zoning
Board of Appeals.
Id. at 196-97, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 195, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 188-89 (construing FGL & L Property Corp. v. City
of Rye, 66 N.Y.2d 111, 485 N.E.2d 986, 495 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1985)).
206. Id. at 199, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 129-131.
208. See Kirstin Downey, A Conservative Supreme Court Addresses Property
Rights, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1992, at H1 (referring to "an increasingly militant property
rights movement"); Keith Schneider, Environmental Laws Face Stiff Test From Land-
owners, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al; see also, The Private Property Rights Act of
1991, S.50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This act is evidence of the rigorous efforts of
property rights efforts in the legislative arena. If enacted, this bill would have required
federal agencies to conduct a "Takings Impact Analysis," that is, to assess whether regu-
lations that they adopt might result in a taking of private property, and to avoid such an
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from a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment were first
sown in 1922, when Justice Holmes stated "while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking."20 9 For a half century thereafter the
Court entertained no occasion to explain how to determine when
a regulation could become a taking by going too far. Beginning
in 1978210 and culminating in 1987 in a trilogy of cases,21' the
Court struggled with this issue, piercing little of its enigmatic
nature.212 Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Euclid v. Am-
bler in 1926, it has reviewed challenges to regulations that arbi-
trate burdens and benefits among property owners giving great
deference to the regulator, striking down regulations rarely and
only when the challenger can prove conclusively that the regula-
tion in question has "no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare '213 or that the regula-
tion results in a denial of "all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of the land. '2 1 4
It was in the context of a case challenging a rezoning of the
plaintiff's property that the Supreme Court articulated the test
by which regulations are judged to determine whether they are
takings. In Agins v. City of Tiburon,215 which involved a land-
effect, where possible. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988), which ad-
ministratively imposed the same required actions on federal agencies that the Act would
have.
209. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
210. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
211. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
212. "Even the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about
the scope of [the] Court's takings jurisprudence." NoUan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
213. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If the valid-
ity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control."); see supra note 30. Compare Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603, 608 (1927) ("[C]ity councils ... are better qualified than the courts [to make
these determinations].") and Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927)
("[Ilt is impossible for us to say that [this zoning decision] was clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable."), where regulations were upheld using this approach, with Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), where a challenger overcame this presumption of
validity by proving affirmatively that the regulation bore no relation to advancing a pub-
lic interest.
214. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
215. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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owner's challenge to the city's zoning ordinance, the Court
framed a two-pronged test, drawing from two of its earlier cases.
Zoning "effects a taking if the ordinance (1) 'does not substan-
tially advance a legitimate state interest' or (2) if it 'denies an
owner economically viable use of his land.' "216
The Supreme Court in Agins articulated a standard set of
considerations for courts to use when they review takings chal-
lenges in the context of a challenge to a local zoning provision:
1. On its face, is the "'justice and fairness' guaranteed by
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments" respected by the
regulation?2 11
2. The principal indicator of fairness is "in essence, a deter-
mination that the public at large, rather than a single owner,
must bear the burden ....
3. An additional indicator that fairness is effected is that
the regulation involves reciprocal benefits to the landowner and
the public. 219
4. Since "no precise rule determines when property has been
taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing of private
and public interests, ' ' 2 0 particularly in close cases.
5. The public "benefits must be considered along with any
diminution in market value" of the affected property.221
6. Determinations of the legislature regarding the first prong
of the Agins test, the legitimacy of the public interest, will be
"clothed with a strong presumption of constitutionality. "222
216. Id. at 260 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 and Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138
n.36). Compare this standard to that used by the court in McMinn v. Oyster Bay, 66
N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
217. Id. at 263 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
218. Id. at 260; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923 (1992) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens characterized this notion as follows: "Perhaps the
most familiar application of this principle of generality arises in zoning cases. A diminu-
tion of value caused by a zoning regulation is far less likely to constitute a taking if it is
part of a general and comprehensive land use plan." Id. at 2923.
219. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
220. Id. at 260-61 (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 262.
222. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Town of East Hampton, 82 A.D.2d 551, 553, 442
N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (2d Dep't 1981) (citing Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper
Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 414 N.E.2d 680, 682, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1980); Mar-
cus Assoc. v. Town of Huntington, 45 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 382 N.E.2d 1323, 1324, 410
N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (1978); McGowan v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 434, 436, 361 N.E.2d 1025,
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7. Implicit in the presumption of validity is that the chal-
lenger of the regulation must bear the burden of proving its in-
validity. This is particularly difficult, with respect to the first
prong, due to the presumption.
These rules, derived from seminal cases, demonstrate the
operating method adopted by a court that perceives itself to be
working within the "stable core" of regulatory takings law.'23
That operating method is deferential to a legislature that is pur-
suing a comprehensive plan for the municipality, meting out
burdens on landowners generally for the overall benefit of the
community. The court's sense of justice is not offended by a se-
vere and demonstrated diminution in value, or by the methods
used or objectives pursued by the regulators.
To the extent that the legislative body has tied a regulation
to a clearly stated plan, one that spells out the public interest
pursued, the regulation will have a better chance of surviving
whatever level of scrutiny a court decides to apply. In fact, it can
be argued that a court is likely to select the standard of review it
will apply depending on its sense of the seriousness of the public
purpose advanced by it. The plan, if drafted with integrity, and
properly advanced by the regulation, can greatly influence such
matters.
The conclusions drawn from a close reading of Udell and
this brief discussion of regulatory takings cases are sustained by
a review of the decisions of the New York courts that routinely
sustain zoning regulations that are clearly supported by sound
planning rationale. Several of these cases, and the importance
they place on conforming regulations to planning, are discussed
1026, 393 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1977); Dauerheim, Inc. v. Town Bd., 33 N.Y.2d 468, 473,
310 N.E.2d 516, 519, 354 N.Y.S.2d 909, 914 (1974)). In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), the Court wrote:
If these reasons .. do not demonstrate the wisdom ... of those restrictions .. ., at
least the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be
said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare.
Id.; see also, Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 ("[Elxercises of the city's police power to protect
[its] residents .. .have long been recognized as legitimate.) (footnote omitted).
223. See John Nolon, Footprints in the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms: A
Practical Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 25 (1992),
citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 99 (Paul Gewirtz ed. &
Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989).
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below.224
B. Compliance With A Comprehensive Plan Validates Land
Use Regulations
Dur-Bar Realty Co. v. City of Utica"2 5 illustrates how com-
pliance with a comprehensive plan will save even the most bur-
densome land regulations. In Dur-Bar, the plaintiff sought to in-
validate portions of the city zoning ordinance that created a
"Land Conservation District." '26 The subject parcel was located
completely within the flood plain of a river classified as a "Land
Conservation District" by the city zoning ordinance.2 7 The
plaintiff made two applications for special permits, but both
were denied because the location within the flood plain required
large amounts of landfill. 28 Subsequently, the plaintiff brought
suit, claiming that the ordinance was not "in accord with a well
considered plan" and beyond the power of the enabling
legislation.229
The pivotal issue for the appellate division was whether the
denial of the special permit furthered the "well considered
plan." The court found the city ordinance to be "comprehensive
. . . containing detailed use provisions and a carefully drawn
map" that demonstrated "orderly and painstaking fore-
thought."23 The ordinance also contained evidence that it was
"based on the Master Plan for the City of Utica."'23 ' The "Land
224. For a review of regulatory takings cases and a discussion of the standards of
review applied to various types of takings cases, see id.
225. 57 A.D.2d 51, 394 N.Y.S.2d 913 (4th Dep't 1977).
226. Id. at 52, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
227. Id. Utica's ordinance created fourteen zoning districts. Id. The "Land Conser-
vation District" permitted only limited special uses: (1) farm and other agricultural oper-
ations; (2) parks, golf courses, athletic facilities; (3) essential services; (4) disposal facili-
ties and landfill operations; and (5) marinas. Id. at 52-53, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
228. Id. at 53, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 915. This required a permit from the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation, but this agency advised the planning board
that the permit would never be issued due to the location of the parcels within the flood
plain. Id.
229. Id. at 53, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16 (quoting N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (Mc-
Kinney 1987)).
230. Id., 394 N.Y.S.2d at 916; see also N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKin-
ney 1987) ("Such regulations ... shall be made . . . in accord with a well considered
plan .... ").
231. Dur-Bar Realty Co., 57 A.D.2d at 53, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (citing UTICA ZONING
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Conservation District" was created after carefully assessing the
character of the land in light of protecting the public from
hazards that would result from "intensive development" of the
area.232 The district presented a number of problems, such as
drainage and topography, that could have jeopardized the health
and safety of the community. In addition, adequate standards
existed to guide the Board in issuing special permits.2 33 The
court held that where adequate standards exist in issuing special
permits for specific areas to further the comprehensive planning
strategy of the community, the zoning ordinance will not be ul-
tra vires.234
In McBride v. Town of Forestburgh,2 35 the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a town zoning ordinance requiring
one-acre lots for the development of mobile homes. The plain-
tiffs submitted a preliminary plot plan to the town board and
the planning board for the development of a mobile home
park. 23  When this plan was submitted, the planning board had
no regulations governing the submission of such plans. Likewise,
there were no effective zoning provisions regulating mobile home
parks at that time, but only the recommendations of the plan-
ning board for a minimum one-acre subdivision restriction.37
ORDINANCE §§ 1.300, 1.500-1.590 (1967)).
232. Id. at 54-55, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 916. But see Marshall v. Village of Wappingers
Falls, 28 A.D.2d 542, 542, 279 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655-56 (2d Dep't 1967) (holding that regu-
lating development by special permit in a "Planned Residential District" is not "compre-
hensive planning," but simply a procedure providing for decisions on a lot-by-lot basis).
The court distinguished this case because the character of the district in Wappingers
Falls was not so unusual in topography or location as to justify special use permits. Dur-
Bar Realty Co., 57 A.D.2d at 54, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 916. The Wappingers Falls procedure
was a substitute for "comprehensive planning," while the procedure used in Utica "was
chosen in furtherance of comprehensive planning." Id. at 55, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
233. Dur-Bar Realty Co., 57 A.D.2d at 55-56, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 917. The proposed use
was required to be: ,
'designed, located, and.., be operated [so] that the public health, safety, welfare,
and convenience will be protected'; that the use not substantially injure the value
of the neighboring property; that it be compatible with adjoining development
and the proposed character of the district; and that it conform to 'all applicable
regulations governing the district where located.'
Id. at 56, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (citing UTICA ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 6.600, 9.500 (1967)).
234. Id. at 54-55, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
235. 54 A.D.2d 396, 388 N.Y.S.2d 940 (3d Dep't 1976).
236. Id. at 397, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 941-42.
237. Id., 388 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
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After this application was rejected, a mobile home ordinance re-
quiring minimum lots of one-acre was enacted. The plaintiffs
brought this action to declare the ordinance ineffective because
their application preceded the adoption of the plan."3 8 The trial
court upheld the ordinance as constitutional and not violative of
the plaintiffs' due process rights. 39 The plaintiffs maintained
that the zoning ordinance was ultra vires as not in accord with a
comprehensive plan and appealed the decision of the trial
court.240
The appellate division upheld the ordinance as enacted and
held that it was not ultra vires.241 The court stated that "the
requirements of the enabling statute are met if implicit in the
ordinance there is the element of planning which is both rational
and consistent with the basic land use policies of the commu-
nity." 42 The existence of planning prior to the adoption of the
ordinance, the rustic nature of the community and other factors
were sufficient to define the community's comprehensive plan.2 4
Thus, the ordinance was not ultra vires.
The plaintiff in Daum v. Meade2" owned a residentially im-
proved parcel adjacent to an area that the town rezoned as a
"Planned Industrial Park. 2 4 5 Prior to the rezoning, the town
board had commissioned a planning study as the basis for a pro-
posed "master plan."2 46 That study was not completed prior to
the rezoning of the subject property.2 4 The plaintiff challenged
238. Id.
239. Id. at 397-98, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
240. Id. The plaintiffs also contended that they would suffer undue economic injury
if the ordinance was not invalidated, that the ordinance was unconstitutional as it ap-
plied to them, and that the ordinance abrogated their vested rights in the property as
zoned prior to the enactment. Id. at 398-99, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43.
241. Id. at 398, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
242. Id. (citing 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, NEw YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE,
§ 5.02 (2d ed. 1973)).
243. Id.
244. 65 Misc. 2d 572, 318 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).
245. Id. at 572-73, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The property was the site of sand excava-
tion mines; the county had condemned and acquired title to the most northerly 650 acres
of defendant's property. Id. at 573, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 201. Subsequently, the town sought
to amend the building zone ordinance and map to create the new district and apply it to
this newly acquired parcel. Id. at 574-75, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
246. Id. at 575, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
247. Id.
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this action as "not made in accord with a 'comprehensive
plan.' "248 The plaintiff argued that the term "comprehensive
plan" as stated in section 263 of the Town Law- meant the
"master plan" that was commissioned by the Town Board.249
The court disagreed with the plaintiff's interpretation of a
"comprehensive plan;" it stated that a comprehensive plan "can
be found by examining all the relevant evidence, ' 250 including
especially "the [town's] zoning law itself and the zoning map."2 51
The court affirmed that zoning should "not conflict with the
fundamental land use policies and development plans of the
community" 25 2 that "may be garnered from any available source,
most especially the master plan of the community, if any has
been adopted, the zoning law itself and the zoning map. '253
Since these sources identified the need to provide sites for in-
dustrial growth, pointed to the increasing scarcity of land availa-
ble for that purpose, and justified the development of the sub-
ject parcel to help satisfy those needs, the court found that the
parcel's rezoning was in accordance with comprehensive
planning.254
In Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown,255 the plaintiff ques-
tioned the validity of two amendments to the village's zoning
ordinance that created a new district permitting multiple-family
dwellings in single-family districts. 256 The first amendment cre-
ated a new zoning district, yet the district's boundaries were "to
be fixed by amendment of the official building zone map" when
future applications for this district were reviewed and ap-
proved.257 Standards specifying the size and physical layout of
developments under this zoning were prescribed.258 The second
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 576, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (quoting Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 471, 235
N.E.2d 897, 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 895 (1968)).
251. Id. (quoting Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 472, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896).
252. Id.
253. Id., 318 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (quoting Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 472, 235 N.E.2d at 902,
288 N.Y.S.2d at 896).
254. Id., 318 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
255. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
256. Id. at 120, 96 N.E.2d at 732.
257. Id.
258. Id., 96 N.E.2d at 732-33. For example, this amended ordinance designated
maximum building height, setback requirements and ground area of the plots to be occu-
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amendment was the village's response to an application for re-
zoning by the plaintiff's neighbor. After "repeated modifications
... to meet the suggestions of the village planning board," ap-
proval was ultimately given.2
59
The court of appeals stated that "[w]hile stability and regu-
larity are undoubtedly essential to the operation of zoning plans,
zoning is by no means static" when "[c]hanged or changing con-
ditions call for changed plans."260 The court stressed: "[a] deci-
sion as to how a community shall be zoned or rezoned, as to how
various properties shall be classified or reclassified, rests with
the local legislative body; its judgment and determination will be
conclusive, beyond interference from the courts, unless shown to
be arbitrary .. ."2' Therefore, "[i]f the validity of the legislative
classification .. .be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control."2 2
It is upon this foundation that the court upheld the two
zoning amendments because they accorded with sound zoning
principles, complied with every requirement of law, and were ac-
complished in a proper, careful and reasonable manner.263 The
village board of trustees was entitled to find that creating the
new districts for garden apartment developments would prevent
young families from moving elsewhere, would attract business to
the community, would lighten the tax-load on the small home-
owner, and would develop otherwise unmarketable and decaying
property.264
The court also found that any allegations of "spot-zoning"
were "without substance. 26 5 "Spot-zoning" is "defined as the
process of singling out a small parcel of land for a use classifica-
tion totally different from that of the surrounding area, for the
pied by the buildings. Id.
259. Id., 96 N.E.2d at 733.
260. Id. at 121, 96 N.E.2d at 733. Private interests must bow to public concerns if
contrary to such classification since "the power of a village to amend its basic zoning
ordinance ... to promote the general welfare cannot be questioned." Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
263. Id. at 122, 96 N.E.2d at 733.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 123, 96 N.E.2d at 734; See Walus v. Millington, 49 Misc. 2d 104, 266
N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1966) (failure to show reasons for deviating from
the plan constituted spot zoning).
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benefit of the owner of such property and to the detriment of
other owners."2 6 The court stated that an ordinance enacted in
accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan is not "spot-zon-
ing," even though it may single out one small plot,6 7 or create
small areas or districts in the center of a large zone devoted to
different uses.2 " The relevant inquiry was not "whether the par-
ticular zoning under attack consist[ed] of areas fixed within
larger areas of different use, but whether it was accomplished for
the benefit of individual owners rather than pursuant to a com-
prehensive plan for the general welfare of the community. ' 26 e
The court upheld the validity of the two amendments because
they were applied to the entire territory of the village2 70 and
they were "in accord with the comprehensive plan" for the
community.27'
Randolph v. Town of Brookhaven27 2 and Place v. Hack173
266. Rodgers, 302 N.Y. at 123, 96 N.E.2d at 734.
267. Id. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735; see, e.g., Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300
N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1945).
268. Rodgers, 302 N.Y. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735; see, e.g., Nappi v. LaGuardia, 295
N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 716 (1945) (a business area was created within a residential zone).
269. Rodgers, 302 N.Y. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735.
270. Id. at 125, 96 N.E.2d at 735-36. The ordinances provided the same rights and
privileges to every owner of at least ten acres. Id. at 122-23, 96 N.E.2d at 736.
271. Id. In the dissenting opinion, Judge Conway found the action of the board of
trustees of the village beyond its power to act under the Village Law. First, the dissent
argued that the "plain language" of section 176 of the Village Law made it essential that
"physical boundaries" be established for the district. Id. at 127, 96 N.E.2d at 737 (Con-
way, J., dissenting). In essence, the reference to "districts" or "zones" in the ordinance
was meaningless without the creation of specified boundaries. Id. Second, the dissent
stressed that the action of the board could not be considered as "in accordance with a
comprehensive plan." Id. at 128, 96 N.E.2d at 737 (quoting N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 177
(McKinney 1940) (current version at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704 (McKinney 1973 &
Supp. 1993)). The lack of investigation by the village to determine areas suitable for
multiple-family dwellings, the absence of standards for the type of construction neces-
sary and the obvious benefit to titleholders of ten acre parcels who may wish to avail
themselves of the ordinance did not constitute "comprehensive planning" by the board.
Id. at 128, 96 N.E.2d at 737. This was "spot-zoning at the request of landed interests
who.., find favor with the board." Id. The "substance" of the two amendments allowed
a non-conforming use in an established zone. This required a variance, which could not
be determined by the Village Board of Trustees since variances were within the sole
discretion of the Zoning Board of Appeals. Therefore, "the particular method adopted by
the Board was [not] in conformity with the legislative requirements found in the Village
Law, and [outside] proper zoning theory and practice." Id. at 130, 96 N.E.2d at 738.
272. 37 N.Y.2d 544, 337 N.E.2d 763, 375 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1975).
273. 34 Misc. 2d 777, 230 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Wayne Co. 1962); see also Daum v.
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exemplify the importance of forethought in zoning actions. In
Randolph, evidence of forethought helped support the reasona-
bleness of a controversial rezoning of a mixed-use area."' Simi-
larly, in Place evidence of forethought supplemented other evi-
dence to prove that there was a comprehensive planning
rationale that justified the major rezoning.175
In Randolph, the plaintiff challenged the rezoning of his
neighbor's property from "single-family dwelling" to "multiple-
family dwelling."2 6 The issue on appeal was whether the "zon-
ing amendment was made 'in accordance with a comprehensive
plan' as required by section 263 of the Town Law. 27 7 The Court
of Appeals repeated the rule that a "'comprehensive plan' is to
be found by examining all the relevant evidence. 2 78 The court
reviewed the existing pattern of zoning, as embodied in the zon-
ing ordinance and the zoning map. This evidence demonstrated
that the pattern of zoning was intended to protect the single-
family residential areas west of the subject parcel by a discrete
barrier.27 9 The subject parcel was an "exception" because the
pre-amended ordinance permitted the construction of single-
family residences in this "intervening barrier."280 The Town
Board found that the development permitted by the amended
ordinance would represent an excellent transition between the
highway and the residential area, in a manner consistent with
past practices relative to adjacent areas. 28' The court concluded
that . . . "'forethought [was] given to the community's land use
problems" and that ... an adequate 'showing [was made] that
the change does not conflict with the community's basic scheme
for land use.' ",282 The court also held that "what is mandated is
[the] comprehensiveness of planning, [not] special interest, irra-
Mead, 65 Misc. 2d 572, 318 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1971) (examining all
relevant evidence and finding the major rezoning supported by a valid planning
objective).
274. Randolph, 37 N.Y.2d at 546, 337 N.E.2d at 764, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17.
275. Place, 34 Misc. 2d at 783, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 589-90.
276. Randolph, 37 N.Y.2d at 545, 337 N.E.2d at 763-64, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
277. Id. at 547, 337 N.E.2d at 764, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
278. Id. (citing Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 471, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895).
279. Id., 337 N.E.2d at 764-65, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 317-18.
280. Id.
281. Id., 337 N.E.2d at 765, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
282. Id. (citing Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 470, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894).
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tional ad hocery."28 Therefore, "a sufficient degree of compre-
hensiveness of planning . . [was] demonstrated and [the]
amendment [was] in conformity with such planning."2"4
In Place v. Hack,28 5 the plaintiffs sought to invalidate a zon-
ing amendment that created an industrial district adjacent to
their properties. 286 They alleged that the amended ordinance did
not accord with the "comprehensive plan," and sought to enjoin
such use of the property.287 The dispositive issue for the court
was whether the zoning ordinance conformed to the "compre-
hensive plan" for the community.288 The court stated that a
"comprehensive plan":
"[Ils not necessarily a 'master plan' such as might be drafted by a
municipality before embarking on a program of capital improve-
ments; ... nor need it be a written plan .... The comprehensive
plan in New York and most jurisdictions is neither a written doc-
ument nor a 'plan' in the usual sense of the term, unless an un-
derlying purpose to control land use for the benefit of the whole
community may be regarded as such. 2 9
C. Land Use Regulations Must Be In Accordance With "Cur-
rent Comprehensiveness of Planning"
In Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 90 Bedford
challenged Mount Kisco's adoption of a resolution rezoning a
7.68 acre parcel of the village from one-family residential hous-
ing to six-story residential housing.291 The parcel in question was
an isolated northern section of the village, bounded on three
sides by Bedford.292 The village's rezoning exemplifies the exter-
nal impacts that one municipality's land use actions can have on
283. Id. (citing Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 188, 306
N.E.2d 155, 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 136 (1973)).
284. Id.
285. 34 Misc. 2d 777, 230 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Wayne County 1962).
286. Id. at 778, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85.
287. Id., 230 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
288. Id. at 780, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
289. Id. at 780, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 587 (quoting David A. Yaffee & Herbert N. Cohen,
Notes, Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 303, 304, 305
(1959) (citations omitted)) (footnotes omitted).
290. 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973).
291. Id. at 182, 306 N.E.2d at 156, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 130-31.
292. Id. at 183, 306 N.E.2d at 157, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
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another; it also illustrates how frustrating it is for impacted
communities, like Bedford in this instance, as they struggle to
exercise any influence over their neighbors' decisions.
The Town of Bedford challenged this zoning change as "ar-
bitrary and capricious," pointing out that it was inconsistent
with a comprehensive plan adopted by Mount Kisco in 1958.293
The matter had been disapproved by Mount Kisco's own plan-
ning board and had been objected to by the Westchester County
Planning Department, as well as neighboring landowners. 94 The
issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, as a matter of
law, the decision of the village board was "arbitrary and capri-
cious.""" It found that although there had been no formal
amendment to the comprehensive plan since 1958, there were a
number of factors that justified the zoning amendment."9 6 The
zoning resolution itself included a finding that changes in the
area since 1958 rendered the newly adopted use in conformity
with that plan. '97
The court stated that "zoning changes must indeed be con-
sonant with [the] total planning strategy, reflecting considera-
tion of the needs of the community." 98 Thus, "[w]hat is man-
dated is that there be [current] comprehensiveness of planning,
rather than special interest, irrational ad hocery." 99 Most im-
portantly, the court stressed that "[tihe obligation is support of
comprehensive planning, not slavish servitude to any particular
comprehensive plan. ' 30 0 Therefore, the proper standard is "cur-
rent comprehensiveness of planning."30' Given this standard, it
was not an arbitrary determination by the village board of trust-
293. Id. at 182-83, 186, 306 N.E.2d at 156, 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 131, 135.
294. Id. at 186, 306 N.E.2d at 158, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 189, 306 N.E.2d at 160, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136. The Village Board had
clearly stated its findings in a formal resolution adopted by it. Id. These findings con-
tained the public interest justifications for its action. They included the need for revitali-
zation of the affected area, the increased growth and population in the community, the
need for housing to serve increased jobs in the area, and the lack of adverse effects upon
the neighborhood. Id. at 187, 306 N.E.2d at 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 188, 306 N.E.2d at 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (quoting Udell v. Haas, 21
N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968)).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 188, 306 N.E.2d at 160, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
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ees to consider the welfare and economic stability of Mount
Kisco as its first concern.3"2
D. When a Court Finds Conformance with "Current Compre-
hensiveness of Planning" it Places a Heavy Burden of
Proof on the Challenger
A property owner in Huntington challenged a local zoning
ordinance that restricted development to single-family homes
built on one-acre lots. The subject property in Tilles Investment
Co. v. Town of Huntington3°3 was undeveloped farmland con-
sisting of two contiguous lots totaling approximately fifty-two
acres.3 04 This property was bounded on three sides by residential
districts, with commercial and industrial zoning to the east and
northeast. The plaintiff contended that the continued residential
zoning of his property was invalid because it was "not in accord
with a comprehensive plan. '3 5
The court of appeals rejected the argument because the
plaintiff did "not demonstrate that the Town ha[d] so deviated
302. Id. at 189, 306 N.E.2d at 160, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136-37. Moreover, "there was
nothing in the record [to] suggest ... the action taken resulted from favoritism for the
owners or any other extraneous influence." Id. at 189, 306 N.E.2d at 160, 351 N.Y.S.2d at
137.
Judge Breitel's dissent focused on the fact that "more than one municipality's plan
was at stake," and that "the usual test of administrative action under the rubric of 'arbi-
trary and capricious' [may not be] the proper standard." Id. at 189, 306 N.E.2d at 160,
351 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Breitel, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the scope of review
should have been determined in light of procedural requirements for notice, hearing and
standing, which considers the interests of conflicting localities and allows the court to
override the delegated authority of the municipality to zone. Id. at 190, 306 N.E.2d at
161, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 137-38. Judge Breitel stated:
Section 452 of the Westchester County Administrative Code, a primitive form of
regional planning, confers on the courts a mandate to perform some sort of equita-
ble adjustment. The section requires that notice and opportunity to be heard be
accorded any adjoining municipality when a city, town or village proposes a zoning
change for property lying within 500 feet of the boundary of the adjoining munici-
pality .... In balancing the equities, flexibility and good judgment must be exer-
cised .... [Tihere is a strong presumption favoring the municipality's delegated
authority to regulate land uses within its own territory.
Id. Therefore, the effect of the zoning on the adjacent municipality could be severe
enough to override the authority of Mount Kisco to rezone the property. Id. at 191, 306
N.E.2d at 162, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
303. 74 N.Y.2d 885, 547 N.E.2d 90, 547 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1989).
304. Id. at 887, 547 N.E.2d at 90-91, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 835-36.
305. Id., 547 N.E.2d at 91, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
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from its original plan that a comprehensive plan [was] no longer
in existence." °6 The court found that although there had been
numerous changes in the master plan affecting the area where
the plaintiff's property was located, the development of sur-
rounding areas reflected the town's original intention to keep the
area residential.3 0 7 "While the statutory requirement serves to
protect individuals from arbitrary action on the part of local
zoning authorities, it mandates 'comprehensiveness of planning
[and not] slavish servitude to any particular comprehensive
plan.' ",308 Therefore, the ordinance was upheld as "rationally
serv[ing] the Town's continued interest in fostering residential
development. "309
V. Comprehensive Planning in the Year 2000
The practical lesson learned from a review of these cases is
straightforward: judges will seldom overturn land use regulations
when it is obvious, in the structure of the regulatory program,
that considerable and comprehensive planning is involved. In
each of the decisions discussed in Part IV, the crafting of a regu-
lation to meet a valid local planning objective saved the regula-
tion from falling under a property owner's attack.
The courts have impressed on local officials that they should
take planning seriously as they consider and adopt land use reg-
ulations. The cumulative effect of the case law provides a power-
ful incentive for local governments to adopt land use plans, to
keep them current and to see that local land use regulations ac-
complish their objectives. However, this is a lesson better taught
by the state legislature. Until the land use statutes are amended
to accommodate this judicial comprehensive planning impera-
tive, New York's municipalities are at risk of not knowing of its
importance and having their land use regulations invalidated.
There is a more crucial lesson that the case law teaches,
however, one that must be learned before the land use system is
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. (citing Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893 and
quoting Town of Bedford, 33 N.Y.2d at 188, 306 N.E.2d at 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136)
(citations omitted).
309. Id. at 888, 547 N.E.2d at 91, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
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capable of handling the challenges of the twenty-first century. It
is that "comprehensive" planning, in modern society, means
planning that considers and is responsive to "regional" land use
needs. When regulations only have local effects, it is enough that
they conform with a land use plan that is "comprehensive" in
that it considers and accommodates the local impacts of land
development. However, as seen in the case of Town of Bedford
v. Village of Mount Kisco,310 the impacts of local zoning and
planning often are intermunicipal or regional in nature. The case
demonstrates the inability of the Town of Bedford to influence a
rezoning in the adjacent village of Mount Kisco.3 1  The impact
on the town was proximate and immediate. Long Island Pine
Barrens Soc'y, Inc. v. Planning Board312 similarly demonstrates
the inability of three adjacent towns to collaborate in measuring
the impacts of their actions regarding over 200 development
projects affecting the drinking water resource of nearly two and
a half million people. 1 3 The Berenson v. New Castle3 " and
Golden v. Planning Board"5 cases demonstrate that regions ex-
perience patterns of development that are greatly influenced by
the land use decisions of constituent municipalities. 6 The pol-
lution of Long Island Sound and New York City's water system
cannot be stopped without some method of coordinating the de-
velopment decisions of the dozens of local jurisdictions in their
watersheds. 7
Today, local land use decisions regularly have regional im-
pacts. This was not the case when the land use system was cre-
ated in the early years of the twentieth century, when communi-
ties were separated geographically. Eighty years of urban sprawl,
hastened by the automobile and expansive highway system,1 8
have brought local jurisdictions and their residents into such
close proximity that their actions greatly affect one another. Cit-
310. 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973).
311. See supra notes 290-302 and accompanying text.
312. 80 N.Y.2d 500, 606 N.E.2d 1373, 591 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1992).
313. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
314. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
315. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
316. See supra notes 57-62 and infra note 332 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 68.
318. See Richmond, supra note 107, at 329-30.
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izenship for most local residents is interjurisdictional as well:
they live in one locality, work in another and shop and recreate
in still others. Although the courts recognize these in-
termunicipal connections and encourage local zoning to accom-
modate regional needs,319 there is no statutory requirement that
local comprehensive plans consider regional interests. The New
York legislature has not provided for a state-wide system of re-
gional plans to which local plans could conform if their local
drafters wished them to do so.320
Without some form of comprehensive planning at the re-
gional level, the intermunicipal impacts of local land use deci-
sions cannot be anticipated, measured and mitigated. These im-
pacts have given birth to a dizzying array of federal and state
statutes, the cumulative effect of which is to further erode local
control over the land.32" ' Without regional planning, there is little
opportunity to coordinate federal, state and local regulations
and programs. This defect in the historic land use system frus-
trates the goals of a large number of interest groups, not the
least of which are local officials who desire to control their mu-
nicipal destinies. Among those directly disadvantaged by the
lack of regional planning are transportation and capital facility
319. See supra notes 57-62 and text accompanying.
320. See discussion infra, notes 340-44 and text accompanying. For examples of two
distinct types of regional planning strategies that do exist in New York, see the
Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 800-820 (McKinney 1982 & Supp.
1993) and the Hudson River Valley Greenway Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW §§ 44-
0101 to 44-0121 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
321. A few examples, illustrative of this point follow: the Federal Water Pollution
Prevention and Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. III
1991) and the State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 17-0801 to 17-0829 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993) together regulate the discharge of
pollutants into both the surface waters and groundwaters of the state which subjects
many development projects to state permitting authority; the National Estuary Program,
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988), under which authority a moratorium on land
development affecting Long Island Sound has been threatened; the Sole Source Aquifer
Protection Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, §§ 55-0101 to 55-0117 (McKinney Supp.
1993), under which litigation halted the development of over 200 projects including
12,000 housing units; and the Wild, Scenic and Recreational Rivers System Act, N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-2701 to 15-2723 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993), which lists
development activities that are allowed and prohibited adjacent to wild, scenic and rec-
reational areas in the state. For a complete discussion of these and numerous other fed-
eral and state statutes that affect local control of land use see, John R. Nolon, The Ero-
sion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State-Interests in Land Use Control, 10
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497 (1993).
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planners, business and development interests, those in need of
affordable housing, farmers, preservationists and environmental-
ists. The stake of each of these groups in regional planning mer-
its explanation.
It is recognized that efficient transportation systems cannot
be created without "comprehensive regional and local land use
planning. '3 2 2 In New York, state transportation planners have
suggested that this difficulty be remedied by the adoption of a
comprehensive regional land use planning system.32 3 For these
planners, the principal benefit of regional comprehensive plan-
ning is that it affords a workable basis for providing transporta-
tion facilities at the same time that development occurs and
when the demand for such facilities is created. If such a system
of regional planning existed, the Department of Transportation,
charged with transportation facility planning, could coordinate
its efforts with those of local governments which have plenary
land use decision making authority.32 4 Among capital facility
322. There will be no solution to transportation and related problems without
better comprehensive regional and local land use planning. .... Comprehensive,
multi-modal and multi-disciplined planning can integrate transportation, air qual-
ity, energy, economic, social, environmental and land use goals and objectives,
maximizing and leveraging limited fiscal resources to meet Federal, State, regional
and local needs. Comprehensive planning and growth management can provide a
balance between land use development and the provision of adequate infrastruc-
ture, while encouraging economic development and preserving and enhancing our
man made and natural environment.
NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF TRANSP., 21ST CENTURY MOBILITY, MOVING PEOPLE AND GOODS,
THE TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY, 262 (1992). This perspective is
shared widely. See, e.g., LINKING TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE PLANNING: A KEY TO
SUBURBAN GROWTH MANAGEMENT, RESOURCE MANUAL, 1990/91, referring to reports with
similar conclusions prepared in Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, and
Washington.
323. "In order to better integrate Land Use and Transportation the following rec-
ommendations are made for implementation:. . . . Support Comprehensive Planning
and Growth Management Legislation to introduce a statewide coordinated planning pro-
cess for State, regional and local governments." NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
supra note 322, at 262 (italics omitted).
324. Under such legislation a State and Regional Planning process would be es-
tablished consisting of a State Comprehensive Plan, State Agency Functional
Plans, Regional and Local Comprehensive Plans. Each plan would be consistent
with the State Comprehensive Plan. These coordinated planning products would
guide the growth management process and provide the necessary linkage between
land use and transportation goals. The growth management process would require
localities to project their needs for roads, water, sewer and other facilities and
ensure that the facilities are funded and constructed concurrently with the growth
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planners of all types there is a deepening understanding that in-
frastructure development cannot occur without benefit of the
type of state-wide system recommended by the New York State
Department of Transportation."2 5
Advocates of economic growth also call for regional land use
planning as a means of avoiding economic stagnation and pro-
moting economic competitiveness. Their reasoning relates
closely to that of infrastructure providers who urge that land be
developed concurrently with the provision of supportive capital
facilities. Private market development is dependent not only on
the requirements of local zoning, but also on the availability of
supportive infrastructure. 26 Business leaders recognize that
fragmentation in land use planning results directly in the frag-
mentation of economic development.2 7 Their recommendations
parallel those of the State Department of Transportation in rec-
ommending intermunicipal and regional land use planning.32 8
The judiciary has called for the adoption of a system of re-
gional planning to protect those in need of affordable housing,
the lack of which has been labeled a "crisis" in New York.3 29 In
that they serve.
Id.
325. In calling for capital facilities to be provided at the same time that the develop-
ment to be served by such facilities occurs, the New York State Department of Trans-
portation is recommending a general approach to infrastructure planning recently
adopted by the state legislature in Florida. The distinguishing ingredient of the Florida
state-wide land use system is its "concurrency" requirement. "It is the intent of the Leg-
islature that public facilities and services needed to support development shall be availa-
ble concurrent with the impacts of such development." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(10)(h)
(West 1990). See Robert M. Rhodes, Concurrency: Problems, Practicalities, and Pros-
pects, 6 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 241 (1990). Concurrency, under the Florida system,
requires that local governments not issue development permits unless the impacts of
development will not degrade public facilities and services below established levels of
quality. JOHN M. DEGROVE, PLANNING AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES 7 (1992).
326. "Most private sector development would not occur without adequate infra-
structure." BDO SEIDMAN, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC VITALITY, WESTCHES-
TER AT THE CROSSROADS 6 (1991) (an interdisciplinary study of economic stagnation in
Westchester County, New York).
327. "With such a fragmentation of planning and development controls, it is in-
creasingly difficult to coordinate business development on a regional basis." Id. at 24.
328. "We believe Westchester is at a crossroads imposing new leadership demands.
We need to retain the businesses we have and attract new ones. We need to have realis-
tic government regulation and zoning and more county-wide planning." Id. at 31.
329. "Although we are aware of the traditional view that zoning acts only upon the
property lying within the zoning board's territorial limits, it must be recognized that
1993]
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1975, the Court of Appeals wrote: "[I]n enacting a zoning ordi-
nance, consideration must be given to regional needs and re-
quirements .... There must be a balancing of the local desire to
maintain the status quo within the community and the greater
public interest that regional [housing] needs be met. 33 0 New
York's courts have recognized that regional land use guidelines
are necessary to insure the provision of an adequate supply of
affordable housing for the residents and workers within the
region.3 31
Similarly, the New York legislature recognizes that the
state's natural environment requires land use regulations that
transcend local political boundaries. For example, the legislature
passed the Adirondack Park Agency Act which placed responsi-
bility for land use planning and regulation over one-fifth of the
state's land area in a regional agency, the Adirondack Park
Agency.3 32 The legislature similarly effected local zoning author-
ity by prescribing development activities that are allowed or
prohibited adjacent to wild, scenic and recreational rivers, which
flow through various political jurisdictions. 33 Under Article 11
of the Public Health Law, adopted by the state legislature, the
State Department of Health in conjunction with New York
City's Department of Environmental Protection, has the power
to regulate land uses over a 2,000 square mile area in order to
protect the quality of the city's drinking water system.33' Under
zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the boundaries of the municipality." Ber-
enson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672, 681 (1975). "The people of New York State face a housing crisis." Governor's Hous-
ing Task Force, Housing in New York, Building for the Future (1988).
330. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (italics
omitted).
331. Zoning ... is essentially a legislative act. Thus, it is quite anomalous that a
court should be required to perform the tasks of a regional planner. To that end,
we look to the Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to foster the de-
velopment of programs designed to achieve sound regional planning .... Until the
day comes when regional, rather than local, governmental units can make such
determinations, the courts must assess the reasonableness of what the locality has
done.
Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
332. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 800-820 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1993).
333. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-2701 to 15-2723 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1993).
334. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1100-1108 (McKinney 1985); see also Mark A. Cher-
tok and Michael D. Zarin, Land Use Conflict Between City and Watershed Area Heats
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state legislation, freshwater wetlands of over 12.4 acres in size
may not be developed without a state agency permit, regardless
of a local jurisdiction's approval of a development proposal.3 35
These are but a few examples of a host of recent legislative en-
actments that preempt, shape or direct local land use authority
in the interest of protecting natural resources of regional
significance.3 '
The state's overarching interest in preserving farmland and
the agricultural economy, an issue of critical importance to New
York's rural regions, led in 1971 to the enactment of legislation
providing for state agency oversight of local land use regulations.
Municipalities in certain areas are prohibited from unreasonably
restricting or regulating farm structures or farming practices un-
less they have a direct relationship to public health or safety. 37
More recently, the state legislature found that "agricultural
lands are irreplaceable state assets" and that "[e]xternal pres-
sures on farm stability such as population growth in non-metro-
politan areas and public infrastructure development pose a sig-
nificant threat to farm operations . . 338 Under this
legislation, regional bodies are given the authority to develop
plans for the protection of the state's agricultural lands.3 39
Finally, New York's strong tradition of local control of land
use has failed to give effective control over the impacts of land
development to localities themselves. No rural municipality is
capable of adopting land use policies that will save the rural
agrarian land base; this it must do together with other munici-
palities for the problem of agricultural land disappearance to be
solved. Similarly, wild and scenic rivers, wetlands, and air and
water quality cannot be protected by the land use policies of in-
dividual communities. This they must do in concert with the
other municipalities in the relevant ecological system. A climate
Up, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 1993, at S-1, S-10 (outlining scope of the watershed area and the
power to regulate within it).
335. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 24-0101 to 24-1305 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1993).
336. For a complete discussion of these state statutes, see NOLON, supra note 321.
337. N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAW § 305(2) (McKinney 1991).
338. Agricultural and Farmland Protection Programs, N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW
§ 321 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
339. Id. § 324 ("County agricultural and farmland protection boards may develop
plans .... ).
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conducive to economic development and an adequate supply of
affordable housing cannot be created by an individual munici-
pality, since these are the products of regional market forces
that can only be affected by regional strategies.
Practically, then, local governments have been stripped of
their ability to control the critical impacts of land development
and to implement important land related policies. Legally, the
recent responses of the legislature and courts to regional
problems, such as the crisis in affordable housing and serious
threats to critical natural resources, have eroded significantly
the authority of local governments to control the use of the land.
How can these diverse and often conflicting interests be in-
tegrated and accommodated in the land use system? Together,
they constitute an interrelated series of interests that must be
addressed as a whole. Housing and job development must be
balanced. Private development of all kinds must be coordinated
with the provision of supportive infrastructure by the public sec-
tor. The pace and location of development must be carefully
measured to prevent the disappearance of farmland and control
its impacts on the environment, so that natural resources such
as endangered species, water bodies and public drinking water
systems are not threatened.
In the New York land use system, there is no provision for
the accommodation of these diverse interests. The ongoing con-
versation about comprehensive planning, envisioned by the
framers of the historic land use system,4 0 has been silenced.
This is so because it must take place today intermunicipally and
among the many interest groups that are affected by the out-
comes of land use decisions. In several other states, recent land
law reforms have restored to local governments the ability to
control these critical land use matters and enabled the discus-
sion about land use decisions to continue among those affected
by them.3 41 Such initiatives, often called growth management
statutes, generally ensure that state and local land use regula-
340. See. supra notes 52-53 and text accompanying.
341. See Symposium, Growth Management and the Environment in the 1990s, 24
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 905 (1991). The following states have adopted growth management
statutes: Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington.
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tions are tied to regional comprehensive land use plans. These
emerging strategies consider, arbitrate, and represent a wide va-
riety of interests including economic and residential develop-
ment, infrastructure provision, the preservation of open space
and agricultural lands, and the protection of the environment,
among others.342
At a gathering at Cornell University, a prestigious group of
New York land use planners endorsed the general pattern of re-
form in these other jurisdictions and recommended its consider-
ation by the legislature and governor. 43 The assembly's consen-
sus statement contained the following observations and
recommendations that clearly mark the path for land use reform
in New York:
* There must be a concise statement of land use planning goals
adopted by the Governor and the legislature.
* Planning must include both vertical and horizontal consis-
tency; all decisions which affect land use, at all levels of gov-
ernment, must be consistent with the state's overall goals and
policies.
" The state must assist in the implementation of locally devel-
oped and regionally coordinated land use solutions.
* County planning agencies should coordinate state and local
planning.
* The state must clearly define cogent regions for the purposes
of need identification, planning and coordination.
* The state should provide financial incentives for the develop-
ment and implementation of plans that are coordinated in
342. Most of the statewide planning statutes require that the following elements be
included in local and regional comprehensive plans: transportation, economic develop-
ment, affordable housing, environmental and natural resource preservation and agricul-
ture. See Patricia Salkin, The Path Toward Reform? Growth Management Statutes in
Other States, Coursebook for a Conference on New York Land Use Law Reform, Chap-
ter 10, Chart J and Table 1, April, 1993.
343. A position statement on these issues was drafted to reflect the consensus of the
participants in the 1990 Spring Conference on the State of Planning in New York spon-
sored by the New York State Association of County Planners, the Cornell University
Department of City and Regional Planning, in collaboration with the Regional Plan As-
sociation, the Upstate and Metropolitan New York Chapters of the American Planning
Association, the New York Planning Federation, and the Upstate New York Chapter of
the American Society of Landscape Architects. The quoted statement was adopted by
the participants in Ithaca, New York on June 16, 1990.
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this fashion." '
Shortly after this statement was adopted by representatives
of New York's principal planning organizations, the state legisla-
ture adopted a regional planning strategy for the Hudson River
Valley that partly responds to the statement's recommendations.
In 1991, the Hudson River Valley Greenway Act was adopted
designating ten counties that adjoin the Hudson River, from
Westchester to Albany counties, as a planning region."' Munici-
palities in the Greenway region are encouraged by the Act to
update their local land use plans and to engage with their neigh-
boring communities in voluntary regional land use planning.-46
The legislation provides for the formation of a regional agency
to assist them, technically and financially, with the preparation
of these plans. 47
Among the incentives to localities to participate in regional
planning under the Act is that state agencies must conform their
actions in the region to the provisions of the regional plan. Once
a regional plan is adopted under this statute, for example, the
State Department of Transportation will be able to ensure that
its transportation facility development accomplishes the objec-
tives of the aggregated local plans. In this way, the Department
of Transportation is enabled to plan in conjunction with those
who possess land use authority, as it has expressed a critical
need to do4.3 s As important, in this one region of the state, the
Act makes it possible for municipalities to reclaim effective local
control over land use within the context of a regional planning
strategy.
VI. Conclusion
The Hudson Valley Greenway Act is an encouraging sign
that the New York legislature is awakening to the land use
needs of the twenty-first century. Despite this beginning, the
legislature has yet to consider adopting a state-wide system of
344. 1990 Spring Conference on the State of Planning in New York, Consensus Posi-
tion on State Planning (June 19, 1990) (on file with the Pace Law Review).
345. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, § 44-0109 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
346. Id. § 44-0119(3).
347. Id. § 44-0119(1).
348. See supra note 322.
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regional planning guided by a clear statement of the state's in-
terest in responsible land use planning. This is so despite the
criticism of the state's court and mounting evidence of discon-
tent among economic interests, developers, housing advocates,
farmers, environmentalists, and local officials regarding the
weaknesses of the land use system. 49 This emerging consensus
that the land use system must be reformed represents an oppor-
tunity for the state legislature to study the progress other states
have made and to respond to the problems identified by the
courts over twenty years ago. 50
The framers of the historical land use system reasoned that
land use regulations should be "in accordance with" comprehen-
sive land planning.-51 In their day, local zoning was the preemi-
nent technique for regulating land use and for shaping regional
development patterns. 5 Federal, state and regional regulations
were not a significant factor in land development at that time.
Cities and villages were largely distinct and geographically sepa-
rate centers of population.
Although the framers of this system were less than clear as
to how tightly and explicitly land regulations were to be bound
to comprehensive planning, the idea was clear: planning, of a
scope and level of detail needed to inform and insure the reason-
ableness of regulations, was required as a precondition of land
use regulation. For this clear vision to be realized today, local
comprehensive plans must be adopted, and they must be respon-
sive to regional needs.
How are local plans to accommodate regional needs when
the state itself has not defined regions for planning purposes,
has not collected and disseminated relevant regional data, nor
properly identified truly regional needs? How is the state to
move toward regional planning when, at the state level, there is
no definition of the state-wide interests in sound regional land
use policies?
The trend toward systematic regional planning is responsive
349. See Alistair M. Hanna, New York Land Use Opinion Survey, 13 PACE L. REV.
415, 421-25 (1993).
350. See supra notes 57-62.
351. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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to these problems. It must be studied and evaluated. The strate-
gies emerging in other states offer a blueprint for reform, a
method of balancing environmental protection and development
rights, returning effective control of land use to local govern-
ments, harmonizing local and state interests, and coordinating
the use of limited public resources with a uniform vision of land
development.
The state's highest court has called for "[s]tate-wide or re-
gional control of planning.-78 3 The stakeholders in New York's
land use system are increasingly critical of it.3"' Other legisla-
tures have adopted reforms responsive to similar sentiments in
their states. It is time for the New York state legislature to re-
spond to the opportunity to enable New York's land use regula-
tors to develop and implement a vision of how and where to
grow.
353. See supra note 58.
354. See supra note 349.
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